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RULE 82 & TORT REFORM: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE IMPACT
OF ALASKA’S ENGLISH RULE ON
FEDERAL CIVIL CASE FILINGS
DOUGLAS C. RENNIE*
ABSTRACT
Alaska is the only American state that employs a variation of the “English
Rule,” whereby the losing party in a civil case must pay the prevailing
party’s attorneys’ fees. In recent years, advocates of tort reform have praised
Alaska’s Civil Rule 82 as a model for tort reform to help rid the overburdened
courts of low merit claims. But does Rule 82 really reduce meritless
litigation? This study compares civil case filings in the District of Alaska to a
sample of other comparable federal district courts. Although filings in the
District of Alaska were lower than the national average, they were
indistinguishable from the remainder of the sample. Other measures also
failed to demonstrate any significant differences between civil cases in the
District of Alaska and the other districts. These results suggest that reformers
looking to reduce meritless litigation should look elsewhere for model reform
measures.

INTRODUCTION
Alaska has long been unique among American states as the only
jurisdiction that follows the “English Rule,” whereby the “loser” in a
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civil litigation must pay the prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees.1 Other
states follow the “American Rule,” which presumes that each party will
bear its own attorneys’ fees.2 Alaska’s version of the “English Rule” is
codified as Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82.3
Rising concerns about defendants being forced to settle frivolous
lawsuits—particularly tort claims—in order to avoid litigation costs
have led some commentators to propose adopting the English Rule in
the United States.4 As explained by one commentator, “[i]f one believes
that there are a substantial number of what amounts to frivolous
lawsuits in which a plaintiff obtains a settlement simply because of the
defendant’s concern about the costs of fighting the case, then fee shifting
would probably serve to discourage suits of that type.”5 Perhaps
inspired by the increased public interest in Alaska in recent years (a
likely side effect of former Governor Sarah Palin’s rising profile), some
academic and media commentators have suggested that other states use

1. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What
Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1946 (2002).
2. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
3. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a).
4. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635,
644–46 (1989); see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Regimes and the Cost of Civil Justice,
28 CIV. JUST. Q. 344, 345 (2009) (“In the United States, the issue of adopting a
loser pays rule has reemerged yet again as a topic of discussion, being pushed
by conservative think tanks such as the Manhattan Institute and Common
Good.”). Notably, similar concerns recently prompted the Supreme Court to
reinterpret the long-settled pleading standard, now requiring plaintiffs to satisfy
a higher threshold to survive a motion to dismiss at the outset of a lawsuit for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559
(2007)); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (citing, inter alia, Easterbrook, supra, at 638).
5. Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Fee Shifting: Lessons from the
Experience in Ontario, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 137 (1984).
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Alaska’s Rule 82 as a model for tort reform.6 Indeed, this view appears
to be gaining traction in some state legislatures.7
But does Alaska’s “loser pays” rule really discourage meritless
claims? This empirical study examines the rates of civil filings, tort
filings, and other criteria regarding the civil cases in the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska and compares them to data in a
sample of federal district courts selected based on demographic,
geographic, and legal similarities. The comparison shows that although
Alaska’s filing rates are lower than the overall filing rates for the nation
as a whole, they are very similar to many courts in the sample. This
suggests that Rule 82 does not have a significant impact on civil filings
in Alaska.
Of course, this is not the first study examining fee shifting, either in
general or with respect to Rule 82 in particular. Yet, much of the prior
research comparing the American Rule with the English Rule has been
theoretical.8 Alaska’s rule has been the subject of significant scholarly
commentary and studies, most prominently a comprehensive study led
by Susanne Di Pietro and Teresa W. Carns in the 1990s.9 However,
efforts to compare the impact of the procedure in Alaska with other
jurisdictions have been limited. Comparative studies examining fee
shifting rules are generally handicapped by significant cultural, legal,

6. See, e.g., Marie Gryphon, Common-Sense Justice in Alaska: The Lower 48
Would Benefit From the Last Frontier’s Loser-Pays Rule, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 28,
2008, 6:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/226102/commonsense-justice-alaska/marie-gryphon (“Perhaps U.S. state lawmakers whose
attention has been captured by Governor Palin’s sudden celebrity will embrace
an Alaskan export other than fossil fuels or King crab: loser-pays principles
could help to make court systems faster and cheaper—and outcomes more
just—from coast to coast.”); see also Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser Pays:
Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1161, 1168–69 (1996) (predicting that other states will
adopt fee shifting practices similar to Alaska’s). Of course, Rule 82 predated
Governor Palin’s administration. See ALAN J. TOMKINS & THOMAS E. WILLGING,
TAXATION OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES: PRACTICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL
COURTS 3 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1986) (noting that the rule has been part of the
Alaskan judicial system for “many years”).
7. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Texas Bill Takes Aim at Frivolous Lawsuits, WALL ST.
J.,
May
24,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702303654804576341783811532312.html (comparing a “tort
reform” bill being considered by the Texas state senate that would require the
“loser” of a motion to dismiss to pay the winner’s attorney fees with Alaska’s
system); Dave Williams, Lawmakers to Consider ‘Loser Pays’ Tort Bill, ATLANTA
BUS. CHRON., Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2009/
02/09/story10.html (comparing a bill being considered by the Georgia state
senate to Alaska’s rule).
8. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
9. See Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule:
Attorney’s Fee Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33 (1996).
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and data keeping differences between nations and even states.10 Given
the common procedural background and statistical collection efforts,
federal district courts provide an ideal data pool for comparison. This
study examines filing rates over a longer, more recent period of time
(the fourteen year period from 1997 through 2010) than prior studies,
within a set of otherwise procedurally similar jurisdictions, within the
same country. The results suggest that policymakers looking for a
“magic bullet” to eliminate low merit litigation should look elsewhere.
They also suggest that Rule 82 is presently fulfilling its more modestly
framed intended purpose—providing partial compensation to the
prevailing party without limiting access to the courts.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I provides background
on the debate over fee shifting, describes prior commentary and
empirical studies, and reviews Rule 82 in detail. Part II describes the
methodology for the empirical analysis. Part III describes the results.
Part IV analyzes the implications of those results.

I. BACKGROUND
This Part of the Article discusses the background necessary to
understand the empirical data. The sections describe the English Rule
and the American Rule, Alaska’s Rule 82, the commentary and
theoretical research on fee shifting, several significant empirical studies
on fee shifting, and the hypotheses about the effects of Rule 82 on
federal civil cases that follow from the prior research.
A.

The English Rule and the American Rule

At common law, a prevailing party could not recover attorneys’
fees from the loser.11 In England, however, a prevailing party could
recover attorneys’ fees from the losing party as a matter of statute by
1607.12 Most jurisdictions13 have since adopted some variation of this
presumption, which is commonly known as the “English Rule.”14 Under
this system, the prevailing party will typically recover part, but not
10. Id. at 71 (“Overall, comparing Alaska’s filing trends and caseload
composition to those in other states was difficult because the data often were not
strictly comparable.”); see also infra notes 114–115.
11. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
12. Id. at 247 n.18.
13. James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under
the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 225 (1995)
(“Throughout most of the Western world the English rule applies, and the losing
party in a dispute is liable for the winner’s legal fees, up to a reasonable limit.”).
14. See Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1946.
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necessarily all, of their fees.15 Recoveries in jurisdictions that follow the
English Rule may range from one-half to two-thirds of actual attorneys’
fees.16 Policymakers have favored partial, rather than full, recovery of
attorneys’ fees in order to deter parties likely to succeed from
unnecessarily prolonging litigation and to encourage settlement.17 Fees
are commonly factored into settlements in jurisdictions that follow the
English Rule.18
The United States, however, is unique.19 Under the “American
Rule,” the prevailing party is generally not entitled to collect attorneys’
fees from the losing party.20 This anomaly developed out of an absence
of specific statutory authorization in the United States, in contrast to
countries such as England.21 The lack of a statute may have resulted
from general hostility towards lawyers in colonial America and the fear

15. TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 6, at vii (“Even under the English rule,
the winner can expect to pay a significant portion of its own costs.”); Kritzer,
supra note 5, at 128 (noting that in Ontario, “[t]ypically, in litigation, a successful
litigant is awarded ‘party and party’ costs to be paid by the other side” and that
“‘[p]arty and party’ costs are only a partial reimbursement for a litigant’s legal
fees; the litigant is then responsible for the balance of his or her lawyer’s fee”);
John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1574 (1993) (noting that as the English
system developed, “the prevailing attorney generally recovered less than the fee
that could be obtained from his own client” (citing John Leubsdorf, Toward a
History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
9, 12 (1984))).
16. See Vargo, supra note 15, at 1599–1600 & n.265 (noting that in many
countries that use the English Rule, it is “only a partial shift that does not
provide full compensation to the winner,” and further indicating that in
England, “winning parties are generally able to recover two-thirds of the actual
solicitor charges” while “[i]n Australia, the winning parties usually recover
between one-half and two-thirds of their costs”).
17. TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 7–8 (noting that in England,
policymakers considered whether “[r]equiring the loser to pay the full amount
of fees might encourage the winner to prolong the litigation; on the other hand,
requiring the winner to absorb a portion of the fees might encourage settlement
or, at least, serve as a brake against dilatory tactics, harassment, or other abusive
litigation practices” (citations omitted)); see also Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6,
at 1162–63 (“As an added safeguard, most countries follow a policy of shifting
less than the full monetary cost of litigation. Because parties must bear a
significant share of the marginal costs of litigation even if they win, they are
shielded from the temptation to over-litigate a winning case for strategic or feeseeking reasons.”).
18. See Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1960 (discussing the practice in England).
19. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975); see also Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1164 (arguing that “fee-shifting
or the lack thereof . . . [i]s one of the great differences between America’s legal
system and the systems prevailing in other advanced countries”).
20. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247.
21. Id. at 247–57.
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that such a statute might provide some justification for their legal fees.22
Despite being an aberration, the American Rule is generally considered
to be “deeply rooted” in American “history and in congressional
policy[.]”23
There are, however, exceptions to the American Rule in the United
States. Congress and state legislatures have authorized the recovery of
attorneys’ fees, or “fee shifting,” under many statutes.24 Some of these
statutes operate in favor of the prevailing party, regardless of whether it
is a plaintiff or defendant.25 This is frequently referred to as a “two-way”
fee shift.26 Many statutes, however, provide that only one party—
typically the plaintiff—may recover attorneys’ fees.27 This type of law is
known as a “one-way” fee shift, and it is the most common form of fee
shifting in the United States.28 Unlike two-way fee shifting, one-way fee
shifting provisions are not policy-neutral and are typically designed to
encourage suits that the legislature has deemed further public policy
goals.29
Courts in the United States have also carved out exceptions to the
American Rule, including situations where parties seek to recover a
fund or property for others in addition to themselves, where parties
willfully disobey court orders, or where the losing party has acted in

22. See Gregory J. Hughes, Award of Attorney’s Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of
Rule 82, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 129, 131 (1975) (“[L]awyers in colonial
America were generally considered disreputable and suspicious, so much so
that in some colonies they were forbidden to receive any fees, or were barred
from the courts altogether.” (citations omitted)).
23. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 271.
24. Id. at 254–55, 260; see also Vargo, supra note 15, at 1588 (“There are over
200 federal statutes and almost 2000 state statutes that provide for shifting of
attorney’s fees.”); Kevin Michael Kordziel, Note, Rule 82 Revisited: Attorney Fee
Shifting in Alaska, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 429, 430 (1993) (noting that as of the 1990s,
“there are now well over 100 federal and 2,000 state fee-shifting statutes in the
United States” (citing TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 31)).
25. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 264 n.37.
26. Vargo, supra note 15, at 1589–90.
27. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1946 (“Most of the statutes that abrogate the
American Rule in the United States introduce a ‘one-way’ fee-shifting regime,
whereby a successful plaintiff may recover some or all of its attorneys’ fees from
the losing defendant, but a winning defendant cannot recover attorneys’ fees
from the losing plaintiff.”); see also Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 264 n.37.
28. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1946; Vargo, supra note 15, at 1590, 1629; see also
Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1165–66 (noting that “one-way” fee shifting in
favor of plaintiffs is “a familiar element of the legal landscape” in the United
States).
29. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 402–03 (Alaska
2007). Notably, the English Rule effectively produces a one-way shift where a
losing plaintiff is judgment proof. Vargo, supra note 15, at 1629.
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“bad faith.”30 American courts have also typically honored contractual
agreements to shift fees.31
Notably, cases in federal court based on diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction have always represented a potential exception as well. As
the Supreme Court has explained, a “state law denying the right to
attorneys’ fees or giving a right thereto, which reflects a substantial
policy of the state, should be followed” in diversity cases absent a
contrary federal law or court rule.32 Deference to state fee shifting rules
in diversity cases guards against forum shopping.33 The diversity
exception, however, has lost much of its “practical significance” since
nearly all states follow the American Rule.34
B.

Alaska’s Rule 82

Dating back to before its organization as a territory, Alaska has
been alone among American jurisdictions in awarding attorneys’ fees as
a matter of course to the prevailing party.35 Since statehood, that
presumption has been codified in Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82.36
The “primary,” arguably even exclusive, purpose of the Rule “is to
partially compensate a prevailing party for attorneys’ fees incurred in
enforcing or defending the party’s rights, regardless of the nature of
those rights.”37 The Alaska Supreme Court has explained that “[w]ithout
the rule, the rights of the prevailing party would be less completely
vindicated because of the uncompensated expense of litigation.”38

30. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257–59 (noting that courts are authorized to
award fees under their inherent powers in particular situations, most notably for
parties seeking to recover a fund or property for others in addition to
themselves, where a party has willfully disobeyed a court order, or where the
losing party “has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive
reasons’” (citations omitted)); see also Vargo, supra note 15, at 1579–87.
31. See, e.g., Vargo, supra note 15, at 1578–79.
32. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 259–60 n.31.
33. See Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1173 (proposing the adoption of
the English Rule in federal court, but discussing reasons why the English Rule
should not apply to diversity cases, including the fear that it would encourage
forum shopping).
34. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 259–60 n.31.
35. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 398–99 (Alaska
2007).
36. Id. at 398–99, 398 n.24.
37. Id. at 398. Additionally, the Alaska Supreme Court has stated that Rule
82 “is not intended as a vehicle for accomplishing anything other than providing
compensation where it is justified.” Id. at 403 n.60 (quoting Ferdinand v. City of
Fairbanks, 599 P.2d 122, 125 (Alaska 1979)).
38. Id. at 398.
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In its current form, Rule 82 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law or agreed by the parties, the prevailing party in a civil
case shall be awarded attorney’s fees” as calculated under the Rule.39
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining which party is the
“prevailing party.”40 “The prevailing party is the one who has
successfully prosecuted or defended against the action, the one who is
successful on the ‘main issue’ of the action and ‘in whose favor the
decision or verdict is rendered and the judgment entered.’”41 Where
both parties prevail on a “main issue,” the court has discretion to deny
attorneys’ fees to both parties.42
The Rule sets out a schedule providing that a prevailing party
recovering a money judgment may recover an additional percentage of
the judgment as partial compensation for its attorneys’ fees as follows43:

Judgment and,
if awarded,
Prejudgment
Interest
First $25,000
Next $75,000
Next $400,000
Over $500,000

Contested
With Trial

Contested
Without Trial

NonContested

20%
10%
10%
10%

18%
8%
6%
2%

10%
3%
2%
1%

In cases where the prevailing party does not recover a money
judgment, the Rule provides that the court shall award thirty percent of
the prevailing party’s reasonable actual attorneys’ fees in cases that go to
trial and twenty percent of the party’s reasonable actual attorneys’ fees
in cases that do not.44

39. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a)–(b).
40. Progressive Corp. v. Peter ex rel. Peter, 195 P.3d 1083, 1092 (Alaska
2008).
41. Id. (quoting Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1321,
1327 (Alaska 1993)).
42. Taylor v. Moutrie-Pelham, 246 P.3d 927, 929 (Alaska 2011).
43. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1).
44. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(2).
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The Rule then provides courts with a degree of discretion to vary
the amount of the fee award based on consideration of the following
factors:
(A) The complexity of the litigation;
(B) The length of trial;
(C) The reasonableness of the attorneys’ hourly rates and the
number of hours expended;
(D) The reasonableness of the number of attorneys used;
(E) The attorneys’ efforts to minimize fees;
(F) The reasonableness of the claims and defenses pursued by
each side;
(G) Vexatious or bad faith conduct;
(H) The relationship between the amount of work performed and
the significance of the matters at stake;
(I) The extent to which a given fee award may be so onerous to
the non-prevailing party that it would deter similarly situated
litigants from voluntary use of the courts;
(J) The extent to which the fees incurred by the prevailing party
suggest that they had been influenced by considerations apart
from the case at bar, such as a desire to discourage claims by
others against the prevailing party or its insurer; and
(K) Other equitable factors deemed relevant.45

Courts must explain their reasoning for any variations.46 There are also
variations on the formula for default judgments and cases involving
equitable apportionment.47 A party must make a motion to the same
judicial officer hearing the merits of the dispute to collect a fee award
under the Rule,48 and the amount is frequently part of the negotiation in
a settlement.49
The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized that “strict application”
of Rule 82 may offend due process by limiting access to the courts.50
Several significant amendments took effect in 1993 in response to these
concerns.51 Those amendments added the variance factors over
objections that they would increase the amount of litigation over

45. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3).
46. Id.
47. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(4), (e).
48. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(c).
49. See Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1960 (suggesting that fees are usually not an
“explicit[]” part of settlements in Alaska, but may also be “essentially a part of
the negotiation”).
50. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 394 (Alaska 2007)
(citing Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 587 (Alaska 1973)).
51. Id. at 406 & n.81; see also Kordziel, supra note 24, at 446, 448 (noting that
the amendments were intended to address a “lack of uniformity in fee awards”
and require judges to articulate their reasoning for awards, and that they
“clearly benefit[ted] plaintiffs vis-à-vis defendants”).
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attorneys’ fees.52 The Alaska Supreme Court also added the provisions
limiting the amounts recoverable by prevailing defendants to twenty or
thirty percent of actual fees, depending on whether trial was necessary.53
Previously, prevailing defendants had been able to recover up to eighty
percent of their attorneys’ fees.54
Notably, the Alaska Legislature has also sought to weigh in on the
effect of the Rule. In 2003, it passed a bill abrogating a judicially created
“public interest” exception, which had the effect of transforming Rule 82
into a one-way fee shift for qualifying public interest plaintiffs.55 The
Alaska Supreme Court upheld the law but noted that the variance
factors, particularly subsection (I), still apply.56
Rule 82 applies to many cases in the United States District Court for
the District of Alaska. Specifically, the Rule applies in diversity cases,
federal question cases with supplemental jurisdiction over state-law
claims,57 and certain other cases involving state interests that are
sufficient to provide a “hook” for the Rule to apply.58 The court’s Local
Rule 54.3 acknowledges Rule 82 as potential authority for an attorneys’
fees award.59
C.

Commentary on Fee Shifting

This section summarizes some of the commentary and theoretical
research on fee shifting. It discusses the predicted impact of fee shifting
52. See ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 1118 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
53. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 406.
54. See Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Alaska: Where the Loser Pays the Winner’s Fees, 24
JUDGES’ J. 4, 6 (1985) (“Awards between 20 percent and 80 percent of actual
defense fees are, as a practical matter, not reversible. These awards can amount
to substantial four- or even five-figure judgments against unsuccessful
plaintiffs.”).
55. Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d at 391–92, 403–05.
56. Id. at 405–06.
57. See Disability Law Ctr. of Alaska, Inc. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 581 F.3d
936, 941 (9th Cir. 2009).
58. See Gentemann v. NANA Dev. Corp., No. 3:08-cv-221, 2009 WL 2486040,
at *3 (D. Alaska Aug. 12, 2009); see also United States v. GBC, L.L.C. Contractors,
No. A03-73, 2005 WL 846211, at *1 n.14 (D. Alaska Jan. 18, 2005) (noting that
under the District of Alaska Local Rules, Rule 82 may constitute “authority for
recovering attorney’s fees in” cases other than diversity cases).
59. See D. Alaska Civ. R. 54.3(a)(2) (indicating that motions seeking an
award of attorneys’ fees should “set forth the authority for the award, whether
Rule 82, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal statute, contractual provision,
or other grounds entitling the moving party to the award”); see also Disability
Law Ctr., 581 F.3d at 940–41 (indicating that Local Rule 54.3 does not permit Rule
82 to apply “[i]n a pure federal question case brought in federal court,” but
“merely acknowledges that Rule 82 can sometimes provide grounds for a fee
award in the District of Alaska”).
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on litigation, arguments for and against adopting the English Rule in the
United States, and commentary specific to Alaska’s Rule 82.
1. Predicted Impact
There has been a great deal of theoretical discussion about the
likely effects of the English Rule on civil litigation as compared to the
American Rule.60 Much of the debate concerns the impact of adopting
the English Rule in the United States.61 Despite extensive discussion and
debate, there remains a fair amount of disagreement among
commentators.62
Some have argued that adopting the English Rule in the United
States would reduce low merit case filings,63 causing an overall

60. See Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1164 (noting that the debate over
the English Rule in the United States has been “largely theoretical”); Vargo,
supra note 15, at 1619 (“Most analyses of competing fee-shifting systems have
been based on theory and supposition.”).
61. See infra notes 63–64.
62. See Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1947–48 (noting the “extensive” amount of
“theoretical work” but “surprisingly little agreement among those who have
undertaken these theoretical analyses”); Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1164
(indicating that commentators have been “unable to reach agreement on even
such basic issues as whether the rules would be likely to affect the rate or speed
of dispute settlement”).
63. Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fie! Foe! Fum!: I Smell the Efficiency of the
English Rule Finding the Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1,
44 (2006) (“American Rule plaintiffs are more likely to file frivolous suits and
suits with a low probability of victory than English Rule plaintiffs.”); Marie
Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the American Legal System:
An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 567, 574
(2011) (suggesting that a “loser-pays” rule “can reduce or eliminate abusive
lawsuits, especially nuisance suits”); Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1161
(arguing that the advantages of the English Rule “are manifold. Most obviously,
it discourages speculative litigation—among the most persistent problems facing
the American litigation system—and it limits the tactical leverage parties with
weak cases can obtain by threatening to inflict the cost of litigation on their
opponents. A claimant will hesitate before pursuing either a long-shot case,
where a low or fluke chance of prevailing is made attractive by a high potential
payoff, or an imposition-based case, whose settlement value arises from its
threat of cost infliction, if he knows he will be responsible for the defendant’s
reasonable legal costs.”); see also Hughes, supra note 22, at 163 (“[I]n at least one
regard, payment of attorney’s fees by the loser might be the more desirable
system, since arguably, the claims and defenses most likely to be discouraged
would be the doubtful and less justifiable ones.”); Hughes & Snyder, supra note
13, at 229 (noting that one aspect of “[t]he most compelling, and certainly the
most often repeated, argument in favor of the English rule is the idea that the
rule . . . discourages plaintiffs with large, low-quality claims”); Kritzer, supra
note 5, at 137 (“If one believes that there are a substantial number of what
amounts to frivolous lawsuits in which a plaintiff obtains a settlement simply
because of the defendant’s concern about the costs of fighting the case, then fee
shifting would probably serve to discourage suits of that type.”); Edward A.
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reduction in the amount of litigation.64 In other words, these
commentators believe that the American Rule causes unnecessary court
congestion by encouraging litigants to file an inordinate amount of low
merit or meritless claims.65 The amount of these claims, in turn, arguably
raises the cost of goods and services to consumers.66 It is this potential
for reducing low merit litigation that makes the English Rule most
appealing to tort reform advocates.67 Others, however, vigorously
Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence
Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 349 (1990) (observing that “the English
rule discourages nuisance suits (i.e., claims that have a negative expected award
for the plaintiff should the case go to trial) . . . . [T]he plaintiff’s implied threat
under the American rule case may be credible, especially when the plaintiff’s
cost of litigating the case is small relative to the defendant’s. Under the English
rule, the nuisance suit strategy is less credible since a defendant who recognizes
that a claim lacks merit has a valuable counterclaim given his costs are likely to
be shifted if the case goes to trial.”).
64. See Bungard, supra note 63, at 63 (arguing that a shift from the American
Rule to the English Rule would result in a decrease in “the overall volume of
litigation”); W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits:
Why is the United States the “Odd Man Out” in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 361, 410 (1999) (“Many who have studied the English Rule as
applied in England have concluded that it causes court dockets to be much less
crowded there than in America.”); Gryphon, supra note 63, at 585 (suggesting
that the English Rule will result in an overall reduction in civil filings because
“[t]here are reasons to think that the reduction in nuisance suits following the
adoption of loser pays would be greater than the increase in small, highly
meritorious lawsuits”); Kritzer, supra note 5, at 132 (suggesting that “the
possibility of having to pay the other side’s costs if one loses” may explain lower
litigation rates in Canada as compared to the United States); see also Di Pietro &
Carns, supra note 9, at 63 (noting that “[i]f fee shifting ha[s] strongly pronounced
deterrent effects, one would expect a lower rate of civil case filings, on the
hypothesis that fee shifting discourage[s] some potential plaintiffs from filing
cases”).
65. See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 568 (“The American rule makes the civil
justice system as a whole unnecessarily costly by encouraging the filing of
[abusive] lawsuits, which defendants must either settle quickly or defend
against at significant cost.”); Vargo, supra note 15, at 1591 (“It is argued that U.S.
courts are congested because of nonmeritorious claims or defenses. Supporters
of this argument suggest that the American Rule encourages frivolous
suits . . . .”).
66. See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 568 (arguing that “low-merit legal cases
clog the American legal system and raise the cost of goods and services to
consumers by forcing businesses that are sued to cover their legal expenses by
raising prices”); see also Bungard, supra note 63, at 62 (arguing that the American
Rule requires “the payment of an equivalent of a five percent tort tax on
wages”).
67. See Kordziel, supra note 24, at 429 (“Segments of the business
community and other tort reform advocates have called for modification or
abandonment of the American rule.” (citing Bradley L. Smith, Three Attorney FeeShifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 2154, 2156 (1992))); Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1164, 1169–71
(discussing the English Rule as a means of tort reform and noting that “[l]oser-
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dispute the premise that the courts are overburdened due to a
preponderance of low merit claims.68
Many have also suggested that the English Rule would increase the
quantity of high merit claims where there is a small amount in
controversy by making these claims economically viable.69 This effect
would also arguably increase the overall quality of claims.70 Others,
however, have suggested that the English Rule may deter some valid
claims.71 Advocates of the English Rule respond that if potential

pays, together with a range of other litigation reforms, made up one of the ten
planks of the Republican ‘Contract with America’”). Tort reform advocates have
traditionally favored measures such as caps on non-economic damages and the
elimination of joint and several liability. See, e.g., Christopher T. Stidvent, Tort
Reform in Alaska: Much Ado About Nothing?, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 61, 71–77 (1999);
Bungard, supra note 63, at 24–25.
68. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 103 (2010) (suggesting that
“claims of excessive costs, abuse, and frivolousness in litigation may have much
less substance than many think, and extortionate settlements may be but another
urban legend” and criticizing “well-trodden clichés” to the contrary); Vargo,
supra note 15, at 1631 (“The English Rule is offered as a cure for courts allegedly
overcrowded with nonmeritorious claims and defenses. These assertions each
require close scrutiny. U.S. courts are overcrowded; however, there is absolutely
no empirical data from any source that indicates that the overcrowding is caused
by nonmeritorious actions or defenses. To the contrary, evidence indicates that
courts are overcrowded because they are inundated with criminal cases and are
severely underfunded.”).
69. See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 583 (“In addition to reducing the number
of nuisance suits, most researchers agree that a loser pays rule would make
viable some small, highly meritorious lawsuits that cannot be profitably tried in
the current system.”); Hughes, supra note 22, at 165–66 (suggesting that fee
shifting may encourage just claims in cases involving smaller claims); Hughes &
Snyder, supra note 13, at 229 (noting that the other aspect of “[t]he most
compelling, and . . . the most often repeated, argument in favor of the English
rule is the idea that the rule encourages plaintiffs with small, highly meritorious
claims”); Kritzer, supra note 5, at 136 (noting that “if a litigant were confident of
winning, fee shifting might encourage pursuit of a smaller case which it
otherwise would not be economical to litigate”); Snyder & Hughes, supra note
63, at 349 (hypothesizing that the English Rule encourages filings of claims with
low potential awards but high probabilities of success); Vargo, supra note 15, at
1590–93 (noting that the arguments against the American Rule include that it
may prevent justice in small claims because lawyers will not take the cases
without a substantial retainer); see also Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg,
Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute
and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 747 (1988) (predicting
that one-way fee shifting provisions would encourage more low stakes cases
with a higher probability of success).
70. See Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 244–45 (discussing “the popular
hypothesis that the English rule improves claim quality by encouraging small,
meritorious claims as well as deterring larger, more speculative claims”).
71. See Davis, supra note 64, at 410 (“The downside of this effect in England
is that the Rule discourages privately funded plaintiffs from bringing
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plaintiffs are so easily discouraged from filing such claims, then perhaps
they should never have been filed in the first instance.72
To the extent that fee shifting does have an impact on the number
of claims filed, a larger number of claims is not necessarily a completely
negative development. Some have argued that if more claims are filed
under the American Rule, it may generate a larger “stock of precedents”
than the English Rule.73 Having more precedents, in turn, arguably
makes it easier for parties to predict legal decisions and comply with the
law, which also provides the necessary conditions to spur economic
activity.74
Advocates of the English Rule argue that it actually inspires
potential defendants to make extra efforts to comply with the law, given
that they know they will also have to pay a plaintiff’s legal fees if they

meritorious claims, or forces them to settle early at a much lower recovery rate,
in part because the cost of losing is always substantial.”); Kritzer, supra note 5, at
137–38 (“The opposite side of the question is whether fee shifting rules would
serve to discourage a substantial number of persons who had valid grievances
but were concerned that they might not be able to win in a court of law, thus
suffering their own damages and also having to pay the other side’s costs. The
impressionistic evidence obtained from this set of sixty interviews points clearly
to the deterrent effect of fee shifting. Many cases that are filed in the absence of
fee shifting would not be filed if the strong potential for fee shifting did exist.”).
72. James A. Parrish, Plaintiff’s View, 24 JUDGES’ J. 8, 53 (1985) (“I also
question whether the system suffers that much when a plaintiff who lacks
confidence in his position, even though it may be well-founded, elects not to
pursue his claim.”); see also Bungard, supra note 63, at 43 (arguing that “the
argument that the risk-averse plaintiff might be unjustly discouraged from
instituting a tort claim to vindicate his rights if the penalty for losing included
the fees of their opponents’ counsel appears to be theoretically unfounded”
because a risk-averse plaintiff can settle or drop a claim before trial).
73. Cf. Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 249. The American Rule may also
make it less expensive for a plaintiff with an innovative claim to bring it to the
appellate courts. See id.
74. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and
Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 544 (1989)
(offering reasons why “a high degree of consistency and predictability in the law
is necessary to the successful operation of the legal system,” including because
consistency and predictability allow for “intelligent planning and structuring of
transactions”).
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fail to do so.75 This “compliance effect” would theoretically magnify any
reduction in tort claims under the English Rule.76
Notably, while the English Rule is often offered as a means of
reducing congestion in the courts, it may create additional burdens on
the judiciary, which must determine the amount of an award.77 Some
jurisdictions employing the English Rule address this issue by
appointing a distinct group of judicial officers to decide fee issues
separate from those who preside over the merits of the dispute.78 Of
course, in such instances, resources are still being devoted to fee awards;
they are merely being re-allocated from the judicial officers presiding
over the merits to a separate group of officers hearing the fee issues.
Apart from decisions to bring claims in the first instance,
commentators have attributed a variety of effects to fee shifting rules.
Some argue that the English Rule generally “increases the stakes” in
litigation and may accordingly increase the overall amount of legal
expenditures79 and encourage optimistic parties to litigate.80 At the same
time, parties who recognize that they are likely to lose may be more
likely to abandon their claims or defenses.81

75. See Bungard, supra note 63, at 50–52 (arguing that “the English Rule
encourages good behavior” and “greater compliance” with the law by increasing
the penalties for bad conduct); Gryphon, supra note 63, at 592 (arguing that the
English Rule produces a “compliance effect” by “mak[ing] legal compliance
cheaper and legal culpability more expensive, [and by] motivating businesses
and individuals to spend more money to ensure the blamelessness of their
behavior”).
76. See Bungard, supra note 63, at 63 (suggesting that a shift to the English
Rule will result in improved “future behavior” as well as “decreased filings of
low probability suits,” leading to a decrease in “the overall volume of
litigation”).
77. See Hughes, supra note 22, at 164–65 (acknowledging a number of
problems with fee shifting, including the additional burden on the courts, the
need to develop a standard to determine the amount of an award, and the
impact on litigants who present good-faith claims or defenses but ultimately
lose).
78. See TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 6, at vii–ix (discussing the role of
taxing masters in the English system).
79. Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 227. But see Gryphon, supra note 63,
at 589–92 (arguing that the English Rule will not actually increase litigation costs
based on the parties’ beliefs that they will eventually prevail because other
factors, like case complexity, drive litigation spending).
80. Snyder & Hughes, supra note 63, at 350.
81. See id. at 353 (“Rather than continue, a plaintiff may decide to abandon
the case either before liability for legal costs is established or to curtail further
liability. As a result, the English rule will encourage plaintiffs to drop their
claims when (i) the claim appears weak, (ii) they receive credible signals from
the defendant that the chances of settlement are remote, and (iii) when both
parties are likely to incur large costs at trial.”); see also Olson & Bernstein, supra
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There is also reason to believe that the English Rule may affect the
likelihood of settlement. By increasing the cost of litigating, the English
Rule may push the parties’ settlement positions further apart.82 At the
same time, the increased stakes may make settlement more likely if the
parties are risk averse.83
Although it is common to make broad claims about the effects of
fee shifting, the impact of fee shifting rules is arguably more nuanced.84
Some have noted that the impact may depend on both the size of the
case and the type of litigant.85 Professor Herbert M. Kritzer has argued
that the effects of fee shifting should be evaluated in the context of an
entire fee regime, including how fees are calculated and regulated in
addition to who pays the fee.86
2. Arguments For and Against
Commentators have made a number of arguments for and against
fee shifting, typically within the context of considering whether
American jurisdictions should adopt the English Rule.87 Advocates of
the English Rule contend that it is fundamentally fairer than the
American Rule because it comes closer to making a winning party
“whole.”88 As noted above, proponents of the English Rule also argue
note 6, at 1162 (arguing that the English Rule acts as a deterrent to “parties likely
to lose”).
82. See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 587 (“Loser pays, by increasing the
amount of money in dispute in any given case (that is, by ‘raising the stakes’ of
litigation), may reduce settlement rates by magnifying differences of opinion
between the parties about what each is likely to gain by going to trial.”); Hughes,
supra note 22, at 167; Snyder & Hughes, supra note 63, at 350 (suggesting that
according to one model of predicting settlement whereby the parties are
optimistic of their chances of success, the English Rule encourages litigation); see
also Bungard, supra note 63, at 63 (suggesting that settlement is less likely under
the English Rule because the quality of claims is higher and “plaintiffs will tend
to vigorously pursue cases to the end of trial where the probability of victory is
high”).
83. See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 587 (“On the other hand, higher stakes
could induce risk-averse parties to settle.”); Vargo, supra note 15, at 1620 (“The
English Rule also escalates legal expenses for those choosing to pursue litigation
and can make settlements likely.” (citations omitted)).
84. See Kritzer, supra note 5, at 133, 135–36 (noting that many interviewees
in Toronto thought that the effects of fee shifting were stronger in smaller cases,
and on individuals, as opposed to corporate entities).
85. See id.
86. See Kritzer, supra note 4, at 345, 365–66.
87. Cf. supra notes 63–64.
88. See Bungard, supra note 63, at 54, 59 (arguing that “[t]he American
Rule . . . promotes the annihilation of the notion of personal responsibility” and
that it “creates a type of moral hazard” because unsuccessful plaintiffs do not
bear “the downside risks” of their behavior); Gryphon, supra note 63, at 568–69
(suggesting that the American Rule is unfair to successful defendants, who must
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that it reduces court congestion by reducing filings of little or no merit,
inspires compliance with the law by potential tort defendants, and
reduces the cost of goods and services.89 Some have also asserted that
the American Rule may discourage productive activities by “wellmeaning persons placed in danger of open-ended legal jeopardy.”90
These commentators accordingly believe that the English Rule can help
eliminate a major source of the larger public’s dissatisfaction with the
legal system.91
Opponents of the English Rule argue that it represents an
inappropriate barrier to the courts and suppresses legitimate claims.92
They question the premise that the courts are inundated with low merit
suits and offer alternative explanations for problems with the civil
justice system, including that it has suffered as a result of more
resources being devoted to the criminal justice system.93 They also note
that other means of providing access to the courts in countries that
follow the English Rule—such as more extensive legal aid and union
funding—do not exist in the United States.94 They further contend that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is a more effective tool in
discouraging meritless lawsuits.95
Some of these commentators have noted that litigation can be
uncertain, and there is not a readily apparent hero and villain in every

still bear the costs of their legal expenses, and deserving plaintiffs, who often
lose part of their compensation as a contingent fee or cannot get a lawyer to
represent them because their claims are not worth enough); Hughes, supra note
22, at 169 (“The basic premise behind the practice is virtually beyond reproach:
to shift the burden of the litigation to the party who is more likely to have
caused it in the first place, either by having injured the plaintiff, or by having
brought the defendant into court to defend against an unjustified claim.”); Olson
& Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1162 (arguing that the English Rule is “ethically
superior to the current system” because it provides compensation to the
deserving party).
89. See supra notes 63–67, 75–76.
90. Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1189.
91. See id. at 1169–72 (noting growing public dissatisfaction with the legal
system and public support for the English Rule).
92. See Vargo, supra note 15, at 1620 (“The English Rule deters claimants,
especially the economically disadvantaged, from pursuing litigation more than
the American Rule.” (citations omitted)).
93. See supra note 68.
94. Davis, supra note 64, at 410; Vargo, supra note 15, at 1599, 1607–09.
95. Kordziel, supra note 24, at 456–58 (arguing that fee shifting is not the
optimal means of deterring “bad faith” litigation and that Rule 11 is a better
vehicle for accomplishing this goal since it can be used to punish the attorneys
rather than the clients); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (providing that by presenting
submissions to the court, attorneys certify that the submissions are not being
presented for an improper purpose and are warranted under the law).
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case.96 They also point to the additional burdens of administering a fee
shifting system on top of the civil justice system.97 Additionally, even
those who accept the argument that there is an excess of low merit
claims might still believe that the American Rule is preferable because it
gives the benefit of the doubt to individual plaintiffs, as opposed to
institutional defendants who are in a better position to diffuse the
impact of the injustice.98
For their part, advocates of the English Rule have proposed various
means of addressing potential access issues, such as developing
insurance to provide coverage for attorneys’ fees in the event that a
plaintiff loses.99 They have also suggested other reforms, such as
applying the fee shifting to each individual “legal initiative” (e.g., a
motion or discovery request) as opposed to cases as a whole, in order to
discourage speculative tactics by all sides.100 They have also noted that
measures like Rule 11, which are aimed at reducing frivolous filings, do
not necessarily address the problems created by low merit claims, which
are not necessarily “frivolous.”101

96. See Hughes, supra note 22, at 164–65 (“Courts exist to settle disputes and
to resolve legal and factual issues about which reasonable men can disagree.
There is not always a right side and a wrong side, and when a case could be
decided in favor of either party, it seems unjust to penalize the loser simply
because the court ruled against him.” (citations omitted)); Kordziel, supra note
24, at 454 (noting that “[l]itigation outcomes are often unpredictable” and
defeated parties may be “justified and reasonable in pressing a strong but
ultimately unsuccessful claim or defense” (citations omitted)); Vargo, supra note
15, at 1634–35 (“Since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized
for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and . . . the poor might be
unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the
penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.” (quoting
Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967))).
97. See Vargo, supra note 15, at 1635 (“Also, the time, expense, and
difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes
reasonable attorney’s fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial
administration.” (quoting Fleishmann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 718)); see also
supra note 77.
98. Kritzer, supra note 5, at 138 (“There is a normative or political argument
to be made that it is better for society to place the burden of injustice on
organizations because the impact of such injustice is more limited and diffused
than if the injustice were to be borne largely by individuals.”).
99. See, e.g., Gryphon, supra note 63, at 602–07 (suggesting that legal expense
insurance can ameliorate the negative effects of the English Rule on low and
middle income potential plaintiffs, who otherwise might not seek justice “out of
fear that they might be liable for a ruinous fee award”).
100. Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1162. This would necessarily increase
the amount of resources the courts would have to devote to addressing fee
shifting issues.
101. See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 597 (distinguishing between mere “weak”
claims and those which are “frivolous” as a matter of law).
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3. Commentary on Rule 82
Despite being a long-standing fixture of the Alaska legal system,
Rule 82’s popularity has fluctuated over the years.102 Much of the debate
over Rule 82 mirrors the greater debate over fee shifting. In particular,
Rule 82’s influence, or lack thereof, on filings is heavily disputed. As
noted above, the Alaska Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the
purpose of the Rule is to partially compensate the prevailing party.103 As
several commentators have observed, the purpose is not to reduce or
eliminate low merit filings.104 The Alaska Supreme Court, as well as a
number of commentators, has expressed concern that the Rule may
impede access to the courts.105 Some have also expressed concerns about
the Alaska Legislature’s elimination of the public interest exception.106
Others, however, have suggested that if the potential award of partial
compensation under Rule 82 is enough to deter someone from filing a
potentially meritorious claim, the system does not suffer if they fail to
pursue it.107
Some have further emphasized that Rule 82, in conjunction with
the offer of judgment mechanism in Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68,
can cause “a catastrophic result” for a plaintiff.108 This is because the
offer of judgment procedure effectively transforms a prevailing plaintiff
who recovers less than a refused offer into a losing party for the
purposes of assessing a fee award, which may be more than the amount
of the award on the merits.109
Another issue of vigorous debate has been whether the Rule should
be revised to provide full compensation. Some contend that full

102. Compare Kordziel, supra note 24, at 443 (“According to a survey of the
Bar conducted in March of 1992 by the Civil Rules Committee, a majority of the
respondents opposed rescinding or substantially amending Rule 82.” (citation
omitted)), with Hughes, supra note 22, at 130 (indicating that Alaska lawyers
were “generally dissatisfied” with Rule 82 at the time and had called for
repealing it at the 1973 Alaskan Bar Convention).
103. See supra note 37.
104. Kordziel, supra note 24, at 445 (noting that survey respondents
frequently commented “that Rule 82 was not intended to be a weapon against
frivolous litigation” (citations omitted)).
105. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 405–06 (Alaska
2007) (citing Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 5–7 (Alaska 1992)
(3-2 decision) (Matthews, J., dissenting)); Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575
(Alaska 1973)); see also Hughes, supra note 22, at 162; Kordziel, supra note 24, at
444.
106. See, e.g., Abizer Zanzi, Note, The Constitutional Battle Over the Public
Interest Litigant Exception to Rule 82, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 329, 352 (2004) (arguing
that the law repealing the public interest exception is unconstitutional).
107. Parrish, supra note 72, at 53.
108. Kleinfeld, supra note 54, at 6.
109. See id.
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compensation is necessary for Rule 82 to provide deterrent effects.110 The
Alaska Supreme Court has generally favored partial compensation for
fear that full compensation would limit access to the courts.111 Others
have pointed out practical problems with full compensation, such as
increasing insurance costs112 and the fear that it will cause attorney
billing rates to rise.113
D.

Empirical Studies

There tend to be many significant differences between jurisdictions
utilizing the English Rule and jurisdictions utilizing the American
Rule.114 Thus, isolating any effects from fee shifting rules can be
challenging, and this problem casts doubt on the validity of crosscultural comparisons.115 Nonetheless, there have been a handful of

110. Gryphon, supra note 63, at 608 (arguing that Rule 82 does not provide
enough compensation “to adequately influence a plaintiff’s decision about
whether to file suit”).
111. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 406 (Alaska 2007)
(discussing Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 5–7 (Alaska 1992) (32 decision) (Matthews, J., dissenting)).
112. Kleinfeld, supra note 54, at 7 (“If the Rule 82 schedule were raised to
market rates, liability insurance premiums would have to be increased
substantially in order to spread the much higher cost.”).
113. Parrish, supra note 72, at 54 (arguing that full attorneys’ fees
compensation would cause rates to rise dramatically). But see Hughes, supra note
22, at 163–64 (suggesting that fee shifting has not led to the inflation of legal fees
or abuse of the legal system).
114. See Gryphon, supra note 63, at 595 (noting that “arguments for loser pays
in the U.S. should not rely too heavily on international differences in litigation
rates uncontrolled by other relevant differences” because “myriad other
differences between nations make it impossible to determine the size of that
effect compared to the many other reasons why litigation rates differ between
countries” (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996))); Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1949 (“In
significant part, there are few studies of the impact of fee shifting because few
legal systems have fee-shifting regimes, and it is therefore difficult to assess their
impact in a rigorous fashion. Cross-national studies, such as a study comparing
the United States (generally governed by the American Rule) and Canada
(generally governed by the English Rule), are problematic because of other
substantive legal differences between countries.”); Snyder & Hughes, supra note
63, at 345 (noting that “the inherent difficulties in cross-jurisdictional
comparisons and the lack of experimentation with alternative rules within
jurisdictions have limited the opportunities for empirical research”); Vargo,
supra note 15, at 1597–99 (discussing the problems with comparative analyses,
particularly with respect to cross-cultural studies).
115. See Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1980 (noting that one of the problems “in
assessing the truth of the proposition that fee arrangement affects broad patterns
of litigiousness” is that “it is difficult to find good data comparing litigation
patterns across countries” (citations omitted)).
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notable empirical studies. Among the most significant studies are
Edward A. Snyder and James W. Hughes’s studies of Florida medical
malpractice cases and Susanne Di Pietro and Teresa W. Carns’s study of
Rule 82. The findings of these studies, as well as two others of note, are
summarized below.
1. The Florida Medical Malpractice Study
The State of Florida adopted a mandatory two-way fee shifting rule
for medical malpractice cases from July 1980 through September 1985.116
The rule was adopted, and ultimately repealed, at the urging of the
Florida Medical Association (FMA).117 The FMA initially argued that the
rule would discourage low merit claims, but it changed its position once
it appeared that filings actually increased after the rule was enacted.118
Some also contended that the rule had evolved into a one-way fee
shifting rule in practice because prevailing defendants were generally
unable to collect their attorneys’ fees from unsuccessful, but insolvent,
plaintiffs.119
The experiment offered a rare “opportunity for a withinjurisdiction evaluation of alternative” fee shifting rules.120 Reviewing the
data, Snyder and Hughes found that although the rule did not appear to
affect a plaintiff’s decision to file a case, plaintiffs did appear to be more
likely to drop weak claims under the two-way fee shifting regime.121
Plaintiffs who proceeded with claims were more likely to settle them,
which Snyder and Hughes took to indicate that the claims that went
forward were of a higher quality under the English Rule.122 They also
found some evidence that parties increased their litigation expenditures
under the English Rule.123
They did not find any evidence of an increase in small judgments,
which they believed “cast[ed] doubt on the popular hypothesis that the
English rule improves claim quality by encouraging small, meritorious

116. See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 63, at 346.
117. Id. at 355–56.
118. Id.
119. Id. Results like this may explain why business interests have generally
been less supportive of efforts to adopt the English Rule than other potential tort
reform measures. See Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1171.
120. Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 234.
121. Snyder & Hughes, supra note 63, at 377.
122. Id. at 376 (“Not only does the rule increase the probability that plaintiffs
will drop their claims . . . the frequency of settled cases rises relative to litigated
cases. This result reflects substantial changes in the set of claims not dropped.”).
123. Id. at 374; see also Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 238 (noting that
defense expenditures were generally “significantly higher” under the English
Rule).
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claims as well as deterring larger, more speculative claims.”124 They also
noted that plaintiffs were more likely to win and that judgments were
higher.125 They suggested that this result could come about because
plaintiffs had to discount their anticipated victory against the possibility
of a loss accompanied by liability for the defendant’s legal costs.126
Ultimately, they concluded that it was unclear whether the English
Rule had a “deterrence effect.”127 They noted the higher proportion of
dropped claims under the English Rule might be “due to plaintiffs
dropping weak claims in lieu of pursuing nuisance strategies,” but it
was also possible that risk aversion and the possibility of higher defense
expenditures meant that “some meritorious claims” had been
abandoned.128
2. Di Pietro and Carns’s Rule 82 Study
In the 1990s, in the wake of the continuing debate over Rule 82’s
effect on access to the courts,129 the Alaska Judicial Council undertook
an extensive study of the Rule led by Susanne Di Pietro and Teresa W.
Carns.130 The study drew on “the rule’s legal requirements with data
taken from judge and attorney interviews and from state and federal
case files.”131
Examining state court case filings, they found that “Alaska’s per
capita civil filing rate did not seem to differ substantially from rates
across the nation.”132 Per capita tort filings were relatively low, placing
Alaska within the lowest group of states, yet still similar to some states
that did not shift fees.133 Tort cases also appeared to constitute a smaller
percentage of the overall caseload in Alaska state courts than in the
nation as a whole.134 The authors also found that tort filings in the
124. Hughes & Snyder, supra note 13, at 244–45.
125. Id. at 238, 240–41.
126. Id. at 245.
127. Snyder & Hughes, supra note 63, at 378.
128. Id.
129. See Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., 833 P.2d 2, 5–7 (Alaska 1992) (32 decision) (Matthews, J., dissenting) (arguing that high attorneys’ fees awards
limit access to the court system); see also ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3) note
(Rabinowitz, J., dissenting from ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 1118) (noting that the
Alaska Judicial Council would be conducting “an in depth empirical study of
the workings of Civil Rule 82” and arguing that the court should await the
results of the study before deciding whether the Rule should be amended).
130. See SUSANNE DI PIETRO, TERESA W. CARNS & PAMELA KELLY, ALASKA’S
ENGLISH RULE: ATTORNEY’S FEE SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES (1995), available at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/atyfee.pdf (last visited November 6, 2011).
131. Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 9, at 49.
132. Id. at 63.
133. Id. at 65, 71–72.
134. Id. at 66–67.
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District of Alaska were slightly lower than other jurisdictions in 1993.135
Overall, the authors thought that the data suggested that “if fee shifting
affects case filing trends and trial rates in Alaska, the effects are complex
and may result in a net situation little different from that found in states
that do not shift fees.”136
The interviews appeared to confirm these findings. Only 35% of
those interviewed could remember a situation where Rule 82 influenced
a client’s decision to file a case or counterclaim.137 Interviewees also
thought that it influenced strategy only in a minority of recent cases that
they had handled.138 Some thought that the Rule was most likely to
influence parties of moderate means, who would be more inclined to
drop a “decent” or “average” case in addition to weak cases.139 A
majority, however, did not believe that Rule 82 deterred “frivolous”
filings,140 which they believed were driven by “non-economic factors.”141
Some interviewees did think that it “occasionally encouraged a litigant
to pursue more aggressively a case that he or she believed to be
especially strong.”142
Di Pietro and Carns made many other noteworthy findings apart
from filing trends. Although tort filings were slightly lower than in the
nation as a whole, they found that more Alaska tort cases appeared to go
to trial.143 They also found that most fee awards were not made in tort
cases.144 Additionally, fee awards were relatively infrequent—only
about 10% of state cases and 6% of federal cases included a Rule 82
award.145 The low frequency of awards appeared to be caused by
frequent post-judgment settlements, with the prevailing party agreeing
to forgo an application for a fee award and the losing party agreeing to
135. Id. at 71.
136. Id. at 72; see also id. at 66 (“In short, although the available data cannot
exclude the possibility that Alaska’s relatively low tort filing rate is related to fee
shifting, neither can one conclude from these data that Rule 82 perceptibly
‘chills’ the filing of tort claims.”).
137. Id. at 78.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 79–80.
140. Id. at 81.
141. Id. (“Comments from attorneys and judges suggested that ‘frivolous’
litigation was driven by factors generally outside the influence of Rule 82,
particularly non-economic factors. These factors included litigating for a
principle or because of emotion. A few attorneys described cases in which they
thought their opponents had evaluated the case incorrectly at the beginning,
giving their clients unrealistic expectations, and then felt obliged to follow
through with litigation.”).
142. Id. at 79.
143. Id. at 69, 71.
144. Id. at 75–76.
145. Id. at 72–73.
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forego an appeal.146 Federal fee awards were generally larger than
awards in state cases.147
These findings led Di Pietro and Carns to conclude that “the three
most apparent effects of Rule 82 were that it (1) discouraged some
middle class parties from filing cases that either wealthy or poor
plaintiffs would file, (2) discouraged some suits (or defenses) of
questionable merit and (3) encouraged litigation in strong cases that
might otherwise settle.”148 The influence of the Rule on tort filings,
however, was “by no means clear,” and to the extent that there was an
impact, it was “selective.”149
One key limitation of the study that the authors noted was the lack
of a control group.150 Indeed, the authors observed that even state-tostate comparisons are problematic because the differing “methods by
which states count and classify civil cases affect filing rates, as do
economic, social and cultural factors.”151 Nonetheless, the authors noted
that many states within the low tort filing group “had significant rural
populations and one or two large cities,” similar to Alaska.152

146. Id. at 73–75.
147. Id. at 76 n.204 (noting that Rule 82 awards were larger in federal cases
and that “[t]he federal cases contained seven awards greater than $100,000. One
reason for the difference may be that cases in federal court may involve larger
damages and judgments than the average state court case. Another may be that
attorneys spend more time on federal cases than on state court cases.”).
148. Id. at 84.
149. Id. at 80. As Di Pietro and Carns explained it:
Analysis of Alaska’s civil litigation trends did not foreclose the
possibility that Rule 82 discouraged potential tort claimants from filing
suit, although the picture was by no means clear. The rate at which tort
cases were filed in Alaska’s courts may be lower compared to other
states, and torts seemed to constitute a smaller proportion of the total
civil caseload in Alaska than in other states. Many factors other than
Rule 82 could account for these data, such as cultural, social and
economic factors, local legal culture or lack of comparability of data.
Moreover, Alaska’s overall civil filing rates were very close to the
median for jurisdictions that did not shift fees. Attorneys did not
believe that Rule 82 obstructed indigent plaintiffs’ access to the courts.
Further, more than half (55%) of the attorneys denied that the rule
discouraged potential plaintiffs with frivolous or extremely weak cases
from filing, although some thought that it did. Thus, if the rule played a
role in discouraging potential tort plaintiffs from using the courts, it
had a selective impact that depended heavily on case strength and
parties’ assets.
Id.
150. Id. at 77.
151. Id. at 65.
152. Id. (citation omitted).
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3. Other Studies
Two other studies are also noteworthy for their findings with
respect to the impact of fee shifting on case filings. In the first, Professor
Kritzer conducted interviews with attorneys and executives in Toronto,
where the English Rule applies.153 He found that among the
interviewees, there was an impression that fee shifting has a deterrent
effect and that consequently, “[m]any cases that are filed in the absence
of fee shifting would not be filed” under the English Rule.154 The
interviewees, however, thought that the impact was more significant in
small or routine cases.155 Professor Kritzer has also noted, however, that
cross-national data “shows that the United States is not the most
litigious nation,” and litigation rates are higher in some nations that
follow the English Rule.156
Second, Professors Stewart J. Schwab and Theodore Eisenberg
studied constitutional tort filings in two federal district courts.157 Based
on dispute resolution models, they had predicted that a one-way fee
shifting statute would increase the level of constitutional tort filings in
those districts.158 To their surprise, however, they found only “scant
evidence” of such an effect159 and suggested that additional research
was needed on the “effect of other fees statutes on filing rates.”160
E.

Hypotheses

As the discussion to this point demonstrates, the theoretical and
empirical literature does not suggest broad agreement on the effects of
the English Rule on civil litigation.161 Nonetheless, assuming for the
purposes of the study that fee shifting is an effective means of tort
reform, one would expect that a jurisdiction utilizing a variant of the
English Rule, such as Rule 82, should have a number of demonstrable
differences with jurisdictions that utilize the American Rule. One of the
most widely claimed effects is a reduction in the number of low merit

153. Kritzer, supra note 5, at 125–26.
154. Id. at 137–38.
155. Id. at 133.
156. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 1981 (citations omitted).
157. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 721.
158. Id. at 745–47.
159. Id. at 760; see also id. at 780 (“Surprisingly, there is little evidence that the
fees statute led to significantly increased filings or to increased access for
prisoners to the private attorney market. These last findings suggest that
attorneys fees statutes may have less of an effect on filing rates than is
commonly believed.”).
160. Id. at 780.
161. See supra note 62.
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filings.162 The simplest way to test whether this effect is occurring would
be to compare the number of low merit filings under the English Rule to
those under the American Rule. Defining “low merit” cases and
identifying them within broad sets of filings, however, is extraordinarily
difficult.163 Nonetheless, if there are fewer low merit filings under the
English Rule, this should be evident in other data. The possible effects of
Rule 82 on civil filings, tort filings, civil trials, and the time to disposition
of civil cases are summarized below.
1. Civil Filings
Commentary suggests that the English Rule should reduce low
merit civil filings and increase high merit, but low stakes, filings.164
Some have also argued that the English Rule also reduces the amount of
meritorious claims.165 The overall number of filings should go down, as
most expect that there would be more low merit claims dropped than
additional low stakes claims pursued.166 Indeed, Snyder and Hughes did
not find any evidence of an increase in smaller judgments under the
English Rule, as it appeared that potential plaintiffs were discounting
their ability to obtain a favorable judgment against their own potential
liability for fees.167
2. Tort Filings
The reduction in filings should be even more dramatic when
isolating tort filings. Unlike contract claims, tort claims are less likely to
be governed by provisions altering general fee shifting rules.168 The
possible “compliance effect,” whereby potential tortfeasors make
additional efforts to comply with the law, should further reduce the
number of tort claims.169 Di Pietro and Carns previously found that tort

162. See supra note 63.
163. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 63, 69.
165. See Kritzer, supra note 5, at 137–38 (suggesting that the English Rule may
“serve to discourage a substantial number of persons who had valid grievances
but were concerned that they might not be able to win in a court of law, thus
suffering their own damages and also having to pay the other side’s costs . . . .
Many cases that are filed in the absence of fee shifting would not be filed if the
strong potential for fee shifting did exist.”). In other words, if Rule 82 limits
access to the courts by discouraging legitimate claims, this should also result in
an overall reduction of filings. See supra note 105.
166. See supra note 64.
167. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
168. See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV.
723, 750 (2011) (noting that “parties commonly contract for fee-shifting
provisions to disincentivize nuisance litigation or defenses”).
169. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
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filings in Alaska were lower than the national average, although they
were not unusual when compared to similar states.170
3. Trials
If there are fewer low merit cases being filed, and potentially more
high merit, low stakes claims under the English Rule, there should also
be more trials.171 Di Pietro and Carns previously found some evidence of
this effect in tort cases.172 Although such an effect might be less apparent
in federal case statistics because of the amount in controversy threshold
in diversity cases, some relative increase should still be evident.173
Additionally, beyond possible effects on low stakes claims, if settlement
rates are lower under the English Rule, as some have argued,174 then that
would suggest that more cases should go to trial under the English Rule.
4. Time to Resolution
On the one hand, under the English Rule, cases should take longer
to resolve because they are expected to be of higher quality and less
likely to be resolved with pretrial motions. Additionally, if the English
Rule makes settlement less likely,175 it is also possible that cases would
take longer because more cases would have to be resolved on the merits.
On the other hand, however, it is equally plausible that cases would be
disposed of more quickly because there would be more small, highly
meritorious claims, and fewer cases being pursued based on the
possibility of imposing discovery costs on the defendant.176 If the
English Rule causes more cases to settle,177 this would also weigh in
favor of a shorter time to disposition. Either way, however, one would
expect an impact on the amount of time until resolution.

II. METHODOLOGY
The combination of Alaska’s Rule 82 and the comparability of
federal case statistics provide a unique opportunity for studying the
170. Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 9, at 66–67.
171. But see Gryphon, supra note 63, at 586 (“High-merit, low damages
injuries are also unlikely to be litigated to trial under loser pays because
defendants would have no financial incentive to resist compensating those they
have genuinely harmed. Loser pays should therefore promote immediate,
appropriate, handling of small injuries in order to avoid litigation.”).
172. See supra note 143.
173. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (providing that the amount in controversy
must exceed $75,000 for federal diversity jurisdiction).
174. See supra note 82.
175. See id.
176. See supra notes 63, 69 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 83.

RENNIE.V22 (DO NOT DELETE)

28

4/17/2012 2:29 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 29:1

effects of the English Rule on civil cases. This Part describes the
methodology of the empirical comparison. The analysis was performed
using publicly available data maintained by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts.178 Any party filing a complaint in a United
States District Court must report certain information about the case,
including the “Nature of Suit,” in a “Civil Cover Sheet.”179 The district
courts maintain other information about civil suits, which the
Administrative Office compiles.180 The two primary methodological
decisions involved in analyzing this data were selecting (1) the districts
to compare to the District of Alaska and (2) the measures to compare the
districts.
A.

Selection of Comparable Districts

No two states are exactly alike. Each state has many qualities that
make it unique. It is fair to say, however, Alaska may have more of these
qualities than any other state. It is geographically isolated from the rest
of the country, has a larger proportion of males than most states, has a
younger population than most states, has a large percentage of the
population (primarily, Alaska Native) that is not Caucasian, has an
unusual climate (to say the least), and has the largest land area but one
of the smallest populations.181 Notably, it is also the only state without a
law school.182 Any one of these facts could potentially affect civil filing
trends.183 Needless to say, drawing analogies between Alaska and other

178. See Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
Statistics.aspx (last visited November 7, 2011).
179. See Forms, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FormsAndFees/Forms/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FormsAndFees/Forms/JS
044_1207.pdf (last visited November 7, 2011).
180. Cf. supra note 178.
181. See Appendix, Table 2.
182. See Mary Berkheiser, Legal Education Comes to Nevada: The Creation of the
William S. Boyd School of Law, NEV. LAWYER, Sept. 19, 2011, at 8 (noting that prior
to the creation of the William S. Boyd School of Law at UNLV, Alaska was the
only state other than Nevada without a law school). Alaska does not, however,
appear to have the lowest number of lawyers per capita. See Highest Per Capita
Lawyers, AVERY INDEX, http://www.averyindex.com/lawyers_per_capita.php
(last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (indicating that Alaska ranks 36th on the list of the
states with the highest number of lawyers per capita).
183. As noted above, many believe that cultural differences may affect civil
filing trends in different countries. Cf. supra note 114. This may also be true of
different states. Indeed, in addition to cultural and demographic differences,
Alaska’s geographic isolation could potentially affect the level of diversity of
citizenship filings in the District of Alaska. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012)
(providing district courts with original jurisdiction over civil actions between
citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000).
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states can be a challenge.184 Although no state shares all of Alaska’s
characteristics, some states do share more than one of them. The districts
chosen in this study to compare to the District of Alaska were selected to
maximize the number of characteristics in common.
In this study, the comparable districts were restricted to single-state
districts. The civil caseloads of districts in states with more than one
district may vary significantly depending on a number of factors. For
example, the location of a major city, state capitol, or prison may all
affect the civil case composition of a district in a multi-district state.185 As
there may also be variations in procedural law between circuits, this
study concentrated on district courts within the Ninth Circuit.186
These criteria led to the selection of Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,
Vermont, and Wyoming as comparable districts. Like Alaska, Montana,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming all have relatively
small populations (i.e., less than one million people).187 Arizona, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon are all within the Ninth Circuit,
and New Mexico and Wyoming are both considered Western states.188
Many of the states have large non-Caucasian populations, and Arizona,
Hawaii, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota all have
significant (i.e., more than five percent) Native American or Native
Hawaiian populations.189 Although no states have populations as young
or as predominantly male as Alaska’s, many in the sample have
populations that are more male and younger than the national
average.190 Additionally, the only other non-contiguous state, Hawaii,
was included in the sample. Data from the entirety of the United States
District Courts was also included as a final comparison. Demographic
and other data summarizing some of the similarities and differences

184. Cf. Gryphon, supra note 63, at 597–98 (“It is difficult to generalize from
Alaska’s experience with loser pays on account of Alaska’s unique geography.
The state has enormous natural resources reserves, a large indigenous
population, and substantially more men than women. Any one of these factors
could affect the rate of tort litigation alone or in combination in ways that are not
fully understood. For example, there is some evidence that men are more likely
than women to be involved in legal disputes.”).
185. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism
into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 725 & n.37 (2005) (noting that
there is a large percentage of prisoner pro se suits in the Eastern District of
California because many of the state’s prisons are located there).
186. See 53 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 § 11 (Supp. 2011) (“Substantive and procedural
law varies widely from state to state and among federal circuits.”).
187. See Appendix, Table 2.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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between districts, as well as the nation as a whole, appear in Table 2 in
the Appendix.191
B.

Selection of Measures

As discussed in Part I.E, if Rule 82 is an effective means of tort
reform, the theoretical and empirical literature would lead one to
hypothesize that it will have a number of effects on civil cases. These
include a reduction in civil filings, a reduction in tort filings, an increase
in civil trials, and either a potential increase or decrease in the time it
takes to resolve civil cases.192
Based on the available data, five measures were selected for
examination in order to determine whether Rule 82 had any effect on the
filing of low merit cases in the District of Alaska: the amount of civil
filings; the amount of tort filings; the amount of civil trials; the median
time to disposition of civil cases; and the percentage of civil cases
pending three years or more. Annual figures for the fourteen year
period were compared using the mean (or average), rather than the

191. This chart was compiled using U.S. Census estimates for population
broken down by sex and race, as well as median age. See Population Estimates,
State Characteristics, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Race, and
Hispanic Origin for States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/asrh/SC-EST2009-03.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 2011) (including files for each state with the population estimates broken
down by race and sex); Population Estimates, State Characteristics, Annual Estimates
of the Resident Population by Sex and Age for States and for Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000
to July 1, 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/
asrh/SC-EST2009-02.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (including files for each
state with the estimated median age by year); Population Estimates, National
Characteristics: Vintage 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
popest/data/national/asrh/2009/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012)
(including files NC-EST2009-03, showing United States population estimates
broken down by race and sex, and NC-EST2009-01, showing the estimated
median age for the United States by year); see also Court Locator, UNITED STATES
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/court_locator.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2011)
(including a map of the United States indicating the borders of the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeal). The data in the chart were estimates as of July 1, 2004,
which is the closest annual estimate in the Census estimates (which are all as of
July 1) to the midpoint of the data range for the study (i.e., March 30, 2004). At
the time of publication, the state population data was no longer available in the
format utilized to compile the charts in this study (the websites last visited on
November 8, 2011, cited above). However, much of the source information still
appears to be available—albeit, in different formats—through the U.S. Census
Bureau website. See Population Estimates, Datasets for All Geographies, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU http://www.census.gov/popest/data/datasets.html (last visited Mar.
7, 2012) (view the “Vintage 2009 State Population” datasets for information
concerning state population estimates by race, sex, and age).
192. See supra Part I.E.
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median, because the point of the comparison was to examine and
account for as large of a sample as possible, rather than assessing a
typical annual statistic for a particular district.193
As discussed in Part I.E, the theoretical and empirical literature
suggests that Rule 82 should reduce the level of civil filings in the
District of Alaska as compared to other districts. The statistical reports
prepared by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
include the annual civil filings for each district.194 The level of civil case
filings, however, is widely believed to fluctuate based primarily on
population.195 Accordingly, it was necessary to control for this variable
by adjusting each year’s civil filings to account for the district’s Census
population estimate for the same year.196
Additionally, it is important to note that Rule 82 does not apply in
certain federal civil cases—notably, cases that only involve issues of

193. See RUSSELL K. SCHUTT, INVESTIGATING THE SOCIAL WORLD 421 (7th ed.
2012) (noting that unlike the median, the mean “takes into account the value of
all cases in the distribution”). Regardless, although some of the distributions
may have been slightly skewed, use of the median would not have changed the
conclusions. See Appendix, Tables 3–7.
194. See Federal Management Court Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics.aspx
(last visited Nov. 10, 2011) (including links to annual district caseload profiles:
select “District Courts” for the relevant year, select the relevant district court
from the drop down box, select “Generate,” in order to view the “Judicial
Caseload Profile” for selected district for the selected year); Judicial Business of the
U.S. Courts, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (including links to Table C-2 of
the “Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts” report, which includes total civil cases
commenced in the United States District Courts for each year: select the “Judicial
Business” report for the relevant year, then select Table C-2). In years where
multiple reports were available, the one for September was used to maintain
continuity with earlier years, where only the September reports are available.
195. See, e.g., Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 9, at 65–66 (comparing Alaska’s
tort filing rate to other states “per 100,000 population”); Kritzer, supra note 1, at
1981–82 (discussing civil litigation rates in various nations “per 1,000
Population”).
196. See Population Estimates, Evaluation Estimates - 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popest/research/eval-estimates/eval-est2010.html
(last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (including population estimates for the United States,
the states, and Puerto Rico from 2000 through 2010 in file NST-PEST2010-01);
State Population Estimates and Demographic Components of Population Change:
Annual Time Series, April 1, 1990 Census to July 1, 2000 Estimate, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popest/eval-estimates/national-regionalstate/ST-2000-7.txt (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (including population estimates for
the United States and each state from 1997 through 1999). Where the Census
estimates conflicted, the more recent estimate was used. Also, as of the time of
the publication of this Article, the data table for the 1990s was no longer
available on the U.S. Census Bureau website. However, it remains on file with
the Author.
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federal law.197 Arguably, isolating civil filings where jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship would provide a more accurate
measure. Unfortunately, that data is not available.198 Regardless,
focusing solely on diversity filings would omit some cases where Rule
82 would potentially apply,199 and in any event, prior research has
utilized approximations to measure the effects of fee shifting rules on
federal filings.200 Moreover, there are similar issues with the widely
accepted data from the Alaska state courts, as Rule 82 does not apply
where another state’s law controls, federal law controls, a statute
specifically provides otherwise, or the parties have otherwise agreed.201
Nonetheless, if the Rule is as powerful and fee shifting is as ingrained in
the Alaskan legal culture as some have suggested,202 there should still be
an identifiable reduction in civil filings in the District of Alaska when
compared to other districts in the sample.
The data for tort filings was compiled in the same manner as the
data for civil filings.203 Total tort filings were obtained by combining the
Administrative Office’s “Nature of Suit” codes for categories “Personal
Injury/Product Liability” and torts other than “Personal Injury/Product
Liability.”204 The tort filing data likely represents a greater percentage of
cases where Rule 82 may potentially apply than the general civil filing
data because there are more diversity cases and because a relatively
small percentage of tort cases are initiated by the federal government.205
197. See supra notes 57–58.
198. The information is collected, see supra note 179, but has not been
reported by the Administrative Office on a district-by-district basis.
199. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
200. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 757 (making comparisons using
“the Administrative Office category that most closely correspond[ed]” with the
types of cases that the researchers were studying).
201. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a) (providing that the fee shifting rule applies
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law or agreed to by the parties”); Alaska v.
Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 403 (Alaska 2007) (noting that in cases
where fee shifting provisions are “intertwined with substantive statutes” those
provisions “govern the award of fees rather than Rule 82”); Ferdinand v. City of
Fairbanks, 599 P.2d 122, 125 (Alaska 1979) (finding that attorneys’ fees awards in
federal civil rights actions in Alaska state court are governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988
rather than Rule 82).
202. See supra note 6; infra note 225.
203. See supra notes 194–196 and accompanying text.
204. See Nature of Suit/Offense Codes, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/fcmcodes2009.pl (last visited Apr. 19, 2011)
(listing the tort codes as civil code categories “B” and “H”).
205. See, e.g., Table C-2 U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of
Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30,
2004, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2004/appendices/c2.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (showing
that in 2004, 43,919 out of 55,023, or 79.82%, of tort filings were based on
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Annual data for civil trials, median time from filing to disposition,
and percentage of cases pending three years or more were compiled
using the annual Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts reports.206 Civil
trials included both jury and bench trials.207 Civil trials were controlled
for population, while median time to disposition and percentage of
cases pending three or more years were not.

III. RESULTS
Table 1 provides a summary of the results. Complete data appears
in Tables 3 through 7.208 As discussed in more detail below, the data do
not show any strong differences between the District of Alaska and the
other districts in the sample.

diversity of citizenship and only 2,258, or 4.1%, involved the United States as a
plaintiff or defendant).
206. See Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx (last visited Nov. 11,
2011) (including links to the annual Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts reports
for 1997 through 2010; data for civil trials appear in Table C-7, data for median
time from filing to disposition appear in Table C-5, and data for the percentage
of cases pending three years or more appear in Table C-6). Table C-6 is missing
from the Judicial Business report for 2002, and accordingly, data for the
percentage of cases pending three or more years for that year was omitted. With
respect to the median time from filing to disposition, more precise (i.e.,
unrounded) statistics were available for the individual districts for the years
1997 through 1999 in the Judicial Caseload Profiles. See supra note 194.
Accordingly, the more precise data was used for those years.
207. See, e.g., Table C-7 U.S. District Courts-Civil and Criminal Trials Completed,
by District, During the Twelve-Month Period Ended September 30, 1997, UNITED
STATES
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2004/appendices/c7.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
208. See Appendix.

RENNIE.V22 (DO NOT DELETE)

34

4/17/2012 2:29 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 29:1

Table 1. Average Annual Statistics for
Sample of Federal District Courts for the 1997–2010 Period
Federal
Civil
Tort
Civil
Median
% of Civil
District
Case
Filings
Trials
Time to
Cases
Court
Filings
per
per
Disposi
Pending 3
per
100,000 100,000
-tion
Years or
100,000
People
People
More
People
All U.S.
91.31
19.60
2.29
8.53
11.06
District
Courts
Alaska
67.99
14.24
1.86
10.03
8.63
Arizona

63.59

6.01

1.39

10.01

5.80

Hawaii

70.08

12.84

1.32

10.06

8.53

Idaho

45.14

7.13

1.48

11.85

5.61

Montana

71.78

15.31

1.50

11.06

7.72

Nevada

116.63

12.55

2.73

8.49

4.15

New
Mexico
North
Dakota
Oregon

81.78

12.75

2.98

9.91

5.78

42.95

9.88

1.31

9.26

2.98

67.24

6.79

1.41

9.89

3.23

South
Dakota
Vermont

55.14

11.34

2.93

11.31

4.69

61.39

12.62

2.73

8.40

4.65

Wyoming

67.30

16.97

4.80

9.43

12.95

As shown in Charts 1 and 2, civil and tort filings in the District of
Alaska were lower than the national average but higher than many of
the districts in the sample.209

209. These results are consistent with Di Pietro and Carns’s findings. See Di
Pietro & Carns, supra note 9, at 65. They found that the tort filing rates in Alaska
state court “fell in the lowest group” of states, but still resembled rates in some
“jurisdictions that do not shift attorney’s fees.” Id. Notably, however, Di Pietro
and Carns found that Alaska state court civil filings “did not seem to differ
substantially from rates across the nation.” Id. at 63.
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Chart 1. Averrage Annual C
Civil Case
Filings per 100,000 People
P
for the 1 997–2010 Periiod
140
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0
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0
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0
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0
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The District
D
of Ala
aska fell withiin the high to
o middle end
d of the samp
ple
for ann
nual average civil filings. It
I was clearly
y below the naational averag
ge
for th
he period bu
ut significan
ntly higher tthan several districts. F
For
examp
ple, it had oveer fifty percen
nt more filing
gs than the Diistricts of Idah
ho
and North
N
Dakota.
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Chart 2. Averaage Annual Toort Filings
perr 100,000 Peop
ple for the 19977–2010 Period
25
20
15
10
5
-

Even
E
more su
urprising, the District of A
Alaska had a higher average
annua
al tort filing rate
r
than mosst districts in
n the sample. Indeed, it w
was
more than double the rates in the Districts of Oregon aand Arizona. If
anythiing, Rule 82 should
s
have a stronger im
mpact on tort filings becau
use
210
it is more
m
likely to
o apply in torrt cases. Th
he result is allso inconsisteent
with th
heoretical ressearch suggessting that the English Rulee should lead to
an oveerall reductio
on in filings due to a red
duced numbeer of low merit
cases and a “com
mpliance effect,” whereby
y potential d
defendants aare
incenttivized to com
mply with the law.211
As
A shown in Chart 3, the District of Allaska’s average annual civ
vil
trials for
f the period was higherr than many districts in th
he sample, b
but
lower than the national average and nearly aas many otherr districts in th
he
samplle.

210. See supra notee 205 and accom
mpanying text..
211. See supra notees 75–76 and acccompanying ttext.
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Chart 3. Averrage Annual Ciivil Trials
per 100,000 Peoplle for the 1997–
7–2010 Period
6.0
00
5.0
00
4.0
00
3.0
00
2.0
00
1.0
00
0.0
00

Although
A
the results may
y have been affected by the amount in
contro
oversy requireement, which
h precludes diversity jurisd
diction in casses
involv
ving $75,000 or less in dispute,212 thiss result is at odds with th
he
nglish Rule sshould increaase
theoreetical literaturre that prediccts that the En
the ov
verall quality
y of claims.2133 It is, howev
ver, consisten
nt with Snyd
der
and Hughes’s
H
findiings that the English Rulee did not appear to cause aan
increa
ase in small judgmentss when app
plied in Flo
orida mediccal
21
14
malpractice cases.
As
A shown in Charts
C
4 and 5, the data o
on the amoun
nt of time un
ntil
civil case
c
dispositiion is split. Similar to m
many other d
districts in th
he
samplle, the Districtt of Alaska had a higher aaverage annual median tim
me
from filing
f
to dispo
osition than the
t national aaverage but a lower averag
ge
annua
al percentage of cases pend
ding for three years or morre.

212. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012
2).
213. Di Pietro and
d Carns had fou
und that there were more torrt trials in Alasska
state co
ourts as compa
ared to other sta
ates. Di Pietro & Carns, supraa note 9, at 69.
214. See supra notee 124 and accom
mpanying text..
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Chart 4.. Average Ann
nual Median Tiime Interval Frrom
Filing to Disposition of Ciivil Cases for thhe 1997–2010 Period
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Contrary to expectations based on the theoretical research,215 these
results suggest that Rule 82 did not have a significant impact on the
amount of time to disposition of civil cases in the District of Alaska.
It is possible that the results are consistent with the presence of a
larger number of small but highly meritorious claims that were not so
complex as to require more than three years to resolve but tended to
take longer to resolve than a typical claim because they were pursued
more aggressively. The problem with this explanation is that most of the
other districts in the sample display the same pattern.
The data do not appear to show any significant differences between
the District of Alaska and the other districts in the sample. This suggests
that Rule 82 did not have a significant impact on civil filings in the
District of Alaska.

IV. ANALYSIS
The results do not show any significant difference between civil
and tort case filings in the District of Alaska and other district courts in
the sample. These results raise a number of questions. First, why did the
expected results fail to materialize in the District of Alaska? Second, and
most prominently, what is the impact on proposals for instituting the
English Rule in the United States? And third, if the results do not
necessarily resolve the second question, what further information is
needed in order to do so? This Part explores those questions.
Advocates of the English Rule are likely to point out, as they have
previously, that Rule 82 provides less compensation than fee shifting
provisions in other English Rule jurisdictions.216 Thus, the lack of any
significant differences between the filings in the District of Alaska and
the other districts in the sample may be due to the fact that Rule 82 is
simply not strong enough to produce the desired results.217 The level of
compensation provided by Rule 82 has been debated over the years, but
has been set at its current, relatively modest, but stable, level since the
early 1990s.218 Concerns over limiting access to the courts and rising
liability insurance costs have prevented anything approaching a full
compensation standard.219 The potential effects on court access for
persons of little or moderate means, in particular, has been a lightning
rod for critics of the English Rule.220 Some advocates of the English Rule
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See supra Part II.E.
See supra note 110.
See id.
See supra notes 50–54, 110–113.
See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105, 111.
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have proposed alternate means of ensuring access to the courts, such as
through legal expense insurance.221 It remains debatable, however,
whether these proposals would work in practice.222
It could also be that the lack of differentiation between the District
of Alaska and the other districts in the sample can be explained by the
fact that those jurisdictions employ a sufficient level of fee shifting for
particular claims so as to influence overall civil and tort filing rates.223
Although not out of the question, this explanation is not convincing
simply because many fee shifting statutes impose a one-way fee shift in
favor of plaintiffs, which, if anything, should increase filings.224
Moreover, fee shifting is unlikely to be ingrained in the legal culture
when employed on a piecemeal basis.225 It would seem unlikely that
claim-specific fee shifting would have the broad impact on claim filing
that general two-way fee shifting is thought to have. Indeed, Schwab
and Eisenberg’s study of one-way fee shifting in constitutional tort cases
suggests that it did not have the anticipated impact on those claims.226
More than anything, these results suggest that more empirical
research is needed on the nature of low merit and frivolous claims. It is
evident that what sounds correct in theory does not always pan out in
reality. Just a few of the important questions that need to be answered
are: (1) what is a frivolous case; (2) what causes frivolous case filings;
and (3) is the number of frivolous filings great enough to require
221. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
222. Marie Gryphon’s proposal, which would require plaintiffs to purchase
insurance before proceeding with a claim, depends on insurers being willing to
offer insurance for potential low and middle income plaintiffs and plaintiffs’
attorneys being willing to subsidize the cost of insurance premiums. Gryphon,
supra note 63, at 602–08. Regardless, the English experience with insurance
suggests that it may create other problems. See LORD JUSTICE RUPERT JACKSON,
REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT xvii (2009), available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/8EB9F3F3-9C4A-4139-8A9356F09672EB6A/0/jacksonfinalreport140110.pdf (proposing various reforms
aimed at reducing civil litigation costs in England, including curtailing broad
two-way fee shifting so as to reduce the need for after-the-event insurance).
Walter Olson and David Bernstein’s proposal, which would require fee shifting
for each individual “legal initiative” as opposed to a case as a whole, would
require a considerable amount of additional court resources to administer. See
Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1162.
223. See, e.g., Jessie R. Walters, Jr., A Primer for Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho,
38 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 17–53 (2001) (describing the numerous statutory bases for
attorneys’ fees awards in Idaho).
224. See supra note 27.
225. Cf. TOMKINS & WILLGING, supra note 6, at 61 (“Unlike in Alaska, where
fee shifting has become an accepted part of litigation, the typical attorney in
federal court who represents a losing party will not acquiesce to fee shifting
without some opposition.”).
226. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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reform? Then, if there is a problem, reformers can craft measures to
address the cause of the problem.
There is a substantial amount of disagreement among
commentators as to whether a low merit or frivolous claim problem
exists.227 Of course, the fact that there is a lack of agreement is no
accident. Developing research studies to answer these questions is easier
said than done. Indeed, defining a “low merit”—or even “frivolous”—
case is no easy task.228 Evaluating whether actual cases are objectively of
“low merit” is even more difficult. Even an after-the-fact examination of
a single completed case might not yield consensus.229 But the fact that
the task is difficult does not mean that it cannot be accomplished,
particularly given the immense amount of talented researchers
interested in the issue.
This Author happens to be among those who, based on experience,
believe that there are opportunities for abuse under the current system
that are not adequately addressed by the existing rules.230 But drastic
reforms should not be made based on supposition, regardless of
whether it comes from this Author, other commentators, or five or more
justices of the Supreme Court.231
227. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
228. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he term
‘frivolous’ . . . as a practical matter . . . is simply not susceptible to categorical
definition.”); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)
(suggesting that “‘frivolous’ claims” might be “defined simply as claims with no
legal merit”); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A] case is
frivolous if it is ‘of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact.’”
(citations omitted)). The definitions provided by the courts are not necessarily
helpful. For example, is a “frivolous” claim one that lacks merit, or one that is
imposed for an improper purpose? See United States v. Braunstein, 281 F.3d 982,
995 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining “frivolous” as meaning “groundless . . . with little
prospect of success; often brought to embarrass or annoy the defendant”
(quoting United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999))).
Presumably, a potentially meritorious claim could be brought for an improper
purpose.
229. Furthermore, surveys, which are perhaps the easiest method to attempt
to evaluate these issues, are also the most problematic because the respondents
typically have an incentive to provide one answer or another. See, e.g., Miller,
supra note 68, at 82 (indicating that based on discussions with practitioners, the
“universal themes” from their comments were that “frivolous litigation is the
lawsuit the other side brings against one’s client” and “abuse is whatever the
opposing counsel does”).
230. I have previously written about the need to reform discovery
procedures that are prone to abuse. See Douglas C. Rennie, The End of
Interrogatories: Why Twombly and Iqbal Should Finally Stop Rule 33 Abuse, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 191 (2011).
231. Cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (declaring
that “it is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by
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Just about every lawyer has probably been confronted, at one point
or another, by someone who had a less than ideal experience with the
legal system and has been called upon to defend the indefensible. It is
obvious that the civil justice system is unpopular,232 but this is not a new
phenomenon.233 And there is more than one explanation for why that is
the case.234 Depending on the cause, there may be more than one
solution to the problem and each of them should be evaluated
carefully.235 Drastic reforms should not be brashly undertaken for the
sake of “doing something.” Or—to paraphrase Clint Eastwood’s iconic
character, Dirty Harry—even if the current system is less than ideal, it is
functional, and until reforms are developed that demonstrably improve
it, we should stick with it.236
The English Rule does make some intuitive sense. As a
fundamental question of fairness, Alaska has long favored partial
compensation to prevailing parties.237 This tradition has been ingrained
into Alaskan legal culture.238 Indeed, the results here suggest that since
the reforms of the 1990s, Rule 82 appears to be fulfilling its intended

‘careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage,’ much less ‘lucid
instructions to juries,’ . . . the threat of discovery expense will push costconscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those
proceedings.”).
232. See, e.g., Olson & Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1169–70 (discussing
dissatisfaction with the legal system).
233. See Miller, supra note 68, at 54 (arguing that concerns about litigation
cost and delay “can be traced back to ancient times”).
234. For example, John F. Vargo has argued that “courts are overcrowded
because they are inundated with criminal cases and are severely underfunded.”
Vargo, supra note 15, at 1631. Recent comments by Justice Scalia, asserting that
Congress unnecessarily expanded the federal drug laws, may lend some support
to this theory. See Jess Bravin, Scalia Criticizes Narcotics Laws, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203476804576614733985897022.
html.
235. Indeed, the speed of the civil justice system is something that is
frequently criticized. If claims were resolved faster, that could potentially also
address the problem of defendants being forced to settle “anemic” cases based
on the threat of having to pay extensive litigation costs. Cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
559.
236. See MAGNUM FORCE (Warner Bros. 1973) (“I hate the goddamn system,
but until someone comes along with changes that make sense, I’ll stick with it.”).
237. See supra note 37–38 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 225; see also Kritzer, supra note 4, at 360 (“Fee regimes are
deeply embedded in legal systems and become part of the broad legal culture
encompassing potential litigants, lawyers, and adjudicators. That is, fee regimes
shape the understanding and expectations of participants. Whatever the existing
system is, it comes to be seen as normal and appropriate.”).
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purpose of providing partial compensation without limiting access to
the courts.239
But that does not necessarily mean that it makes sense to label Rule
82 as a cure-all and package it for export alongside king crab and
petroleum.240 Rule 82’s long, contentious history and many revisions
demonstrate that it is not such an obviously beneficial procedure.241 Any
states considering adopting similar rules should do so based on the
primary justification for Rule 82: partial compensation.242 The data,
however, do not appear to support claims that Rule 82 is an effective
means of reducing meritless litigation in Alaska. Indeed, there already
are a number of safeguards in place to protect defendants from meritless
suits—most prominently, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the fact
that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. Whether these alternative
safeguards can be improved to provide a more effective means of
deterring meritless litigation is a question that deserves further
exploration.

CONCLUSION
In recent years, the English Rule appears to be riding a renewed
wave of popularity among tort reform advocates.243 This has caused
some commentators to invoke Alaska’s fee shifting rule as a model for
reform to rid the courts of low merit claims.244 The results of this study
suggest that those proposals are misplaced. Data from the federal courts
show that civil and tort filings in the District of Alaska, while below the
national average, resembled those in a sample of similar districts. Other
measures also failed to reveal any significant differences between civil
cases in the District of Alaska and the other districts.
The results of this study, rather than supporting the widespread
export of Rule 82 to jurisdictions unfamiliar with fee shifting as a matter
of course, suggest caution is appropriate. Some states may ultimately
decide, as Alaska has, that some amount of partial compensation is
appropriate for the prevailing party in civil lawsuits. But Rule 82 is not a
239. See supra notes 37, 50. It is notable, however, that the elimination of the
public interest exception occurred during the sample period. See supra notes 55–
56. Because it occurred midway through the period covered by this study, and
because “public interest” filings may be too small of a component of the overall
amount of civil filings to affect the result, it is unclear from this data whether the
elimination of that exception reduced public interest filings.
240. Cf. Gryphon, supra note 6.
241. See supra Part II.B.
242. See supra note 37.
243. See supra notes 4, 6–7.
244. See supra note 6.
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“one size fits all” solution to the complex problems of our civil justice
systems. Additional empirical research is needed on the nature of
frivolous litigation and its causes before imposing solutions that may or
may not address those problems.

MEDIAN AGE (years)
CIRCUIT

SEX (% Female)

.Two or More Races

..NHPI

..Asian

..AIAN

..Black

..White

RACE
.One Race

TOTAL POPULATION
98.42%
87.35%
3.67%
5.03%
2.18%
0.18%
1.58%
50.00%
35.83

9th

33.25

9th

5,759,425

ARIZONA

95.39%
70.78%
4.01%
15.46%
4.52%
0.62%
4.61%
48.16%

661,569

ALASKA

9th

38.65

81.21%
28.11%
2.62%
0.48%
40.59%
9.40%
18.79%
49.77%

1,252,782

HAWAII

9th

34.69

98.54%
95.17%
0.71%
1.47%
1.06%
0.13%
1.46%
49.72%

1,391,718

IDAHO

9th

39.79

98.39%
90.79%
0.52%
6.39%
0.62%
0.06%
1.61%
50.07%

925,887

MONTANA

9th

36.04

97.51%
82.40%
7.56%
1.45%
5.59%
0.50%
2.49%
49.17%
10th

36.44

98.41%
84.43%
2.60%
9.94%
1.31%
0.13%
1.59%
50.61%
8th

38.36

98.93%
92.05%
0.92%
5.22%
0.71%
0.04%
1.07%
49.86%

9th

38.52

97.66%
90.71%
1.84%
1.46%
3.37%
0.27%
2.34%
50.40%

8th

37.80

98.70%
88.56%
0.92%
8.45%
0.72%
0.05%
1.30%
50.18%

2nd

40.37

98.91%
96.71%
0.71%
0.40%
1.06%
0.03%
1.09%
50.86%

8th

38.09

98.68%
94.37%
1.08%
2.47%
0.68%
0.08%
1.32%
49.42%

N/A

37.36

98.46%
80.38%
12.76%
0.98%
4.16%
0.18%
1.54%
50.81%

NEW
NORTH
SOUTH
OREGON
VERMONT WYOMING
U.S.
MEXICO DAKOTA
DAKOTA
2,328,703 1,891,829
636,303 3,573,505
774,283
618,145
502,988 293,045,739

NEVADA

2012

Table 2. Demographic Comparison (As of July 1, 2004)
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2006
86.97
53.75
70.57
57.20
36.76
65.96
91.61
68.43
33.18
65.18
53.11
44.36
60.08

2007
85.44
51.04
54.67
52.21
36.17
64.78
96.03
73.69
31.84
67.65
52.54
46.42
55.23

2008
2009
2010 Average
87.86 90.13 91.54
91.31
52.66 54.99 49.37
67.99
54.45 55.09 56.26
63.59
45.16 48.28 57.07
70.08
37.74 42.99 45.52
45.14
63.03 63.75 53.16
71.78
99.06 126.05 116.43 116.63
63.86 65.66 59.93
81.78
41.68 32.82 33.65
42.95
59.22 56.45 60.48
67.24
42.59 42.80 43.65
55.14
45.25 49.08 50.45
61.39
61.21 54.74 53.69
67.30

46

Table 3. Civil Filings Per 100,000 People
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
All U.S.D.C.
101.56 94.99 95.41 91.97 88.02 95.52 87.16 96.04 85.68
Alaska
104.29 81.18 122.18 77.10 72.77 61.06 60.83 56.73 53.96
Arizona
77.37 68.87 64.37 63.26 61.05 61.65 59.62 61.30 81.80
Hawaii
154.86 90.45 77.77 73.57 68.76 68.57 62.44 61.91 62.82
Idaho
51.79 44.42 47.69 58.48 52.77 46.66 42.09 47.37 41.47
Montana
77.39 75.03 74.84 80.70 82.36 77.17 78.66 78.32 69.76
Nevada
141.75 161.31 142.04 116.49 110.01 110.77 111.25 109.86 100.12
New Mexico
105.84 97.67 90.72 103.69 89.48 86.52 86.40 78.62 74.37
North Dakota
51.80 44.55 52.28 51.61 43.54 50.85 45.59 45.48 42.39
Oregon
73.96 67.06 71.39 69.84 72.88 66.23 67.75 71.00 72.27
South Dakota
63.35 60.75 62.46 58.75 61.68 60.92 64.36 52.13 52.90
Vermont
75.77 78.57 69.24 83.98 77.63 56.61 60.32 58.56 63.19
Wyoming
81.67 84.58 74.23 77.94 64.10 64.80 65.95 70.41 73.52
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2000
12.97
20.71
8.15
13.61
18.24
25.79
15.76
20.05
16.84
8.98
13.10
18.04
18.42

2001
11.81
15.78
7.35
10.83
9.69
21.31
8.88
11.65
10.22
8.70
10.67
14.55
16.23

2002
21.87
13.55
5.72
12.80
6.48
14.84
11.31
12.44
14.06
7.11
11.95
12.20
18.92

2003
15.52
12.04
5.06
12.83
6.45
16.36
9.79
12.37
7.92
5.69
9.66
11.68
19.04

2004
18.78
9.86
4.43
11.39
7.19
14.37
9.92
11.32
12.12
5.54
9.18
12.46
16.91

2005
17.37
8.84
3.83
9.53
6.31
12.41
9.80
10.76
7.09
4.89
8.60
12.44
17.79

2006
23.06
9.92
3.54
7.88
4.99
8.03
6.70
10.98
6.92
5.79
9.78
8.23
15.99

2007
20.36
9.71
3.68
7.56
3.74
10.24
7.25
11.65
4.71
4.45
8.67
8.06
13.57

2008
23.67
10.50
3.71
7.66
2.29
9.71
10.37
9.27
12.18
4.47
7.22
6.76
12.77

2009
25.47
11.23
4.74
8.46
2.46
6.06
13.30
8.67
6.50
5.05
7.89
10.46
12.31

2010 Average
26.87
19.60
11.00
14.24
7.46
6.01
12.54
12.84
4.17
7.13
6.73
15.31
11.83
12.55
7.47
12.75
3.82
9.88
5.19
6.79
8.66
11.34
9.96
12.62
12.05
16.97

2012

Table 4. Tort Filings Per 100,000 People
1997
1998
1999
All U.S.D.C.
21.76 18.63 16.29
Alaska
26.61 18.56 20.98
Arizona
9.14 10.54
6.85
Hawaii
27.86 21.20 15.67
Idaho
8.01
7.96 11.82
Montana
21.17 23.42 23.89
Nevada
14.51 21.89 24.36
New Mexico
16.85 19.97 15.01
Noth Dakota
10.92 10.82 14.22
Oregon
9.71
9.23 10.23
South Dakota
16.14 26.82 10.36
Vermont
19.37 16.59 15.84
Wyoming
18.33 20.63 24.60
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2000
2.81
1.75
1.66
1.81
2.69
1.11
2.73
2.53
1.40
1.46
5.43
3.28
6.28

2001
2.28
3.16
1.47
1.31
1.44
0.77
2.67
2.68
0.63
1.33
3.16
2.61
5.07

2002
2.09
2.49
1.14
0.98
1.57
1.98
2.45
2.43
1.11
1.17
3.41
2.44
4.43

2003
2.01
2.01
1.14
0.65
1.03
1.64
2.46
2.73
1.74
1.27
3.39
2.43
5.61

2004
1.87
1.97
1.29
0.80
0.93
1.94
2.41
3.17
1.42
1.74
2.98
2.91
4.18

2005
1.79
1.20
0.99
0.71
1.05
1.50
1.91
3.39
1.26
1.94
2.31
1.29
2.37

2006
1.72
0.74
1.26
1.50
0.96
1.16
2.29
2.16
1.42
0.98
2.16
1.61
1.95

2007
1.86
1.18
1.15
1.50
0.87
1.36
2.30
2.64
1.25
1.26
2.01
1.93
3.63

2008
1.74
1.31
1.00
1.33
0.92
1.55
2.49
2.37
0.62
1.30
1.12
1.45
4.32

2009
1.73
0.72
1.50
1.79
0.65
1.64
2.69
2.49
0.77
0.99
1.97
1.61
3.12

2010 Average
1.73
2.29
0.56
1.86
1.24
1.39
1.69
1.32
1.03
1.48
1.84
1.50
1.96
2.73
1.87
2.98
1.22
1.31
1.35
1.41
1.95
2.93
1.29
2.73
3.47
4.80

48

Table 5. Civil Trials Per 100,000 People
1997
1998
1999
All U.S.D.C.
3.79
3.46
3.13
Alaska
2.46
4.36
2.10
Arizona
2.11
1.74
1.82
Hawaii
1.35
1.01
2.12
Idaho
1.65
3.17
2.80
Montana
1.37
1.71
1.47
Nevada
3.94
4.36
3.62
New Mexico
4.12
5.20
3.91
North Dakota
2.18
1.10
2.21
Oregon
2.22
1.34
1.39
South Dakota
3.69
3.28
4.09
Vermont
4.76
6.27
4.38
Wyoming
6.04
9.38
7.30
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2004
8.50
9.50
10.40
9.60
11.60
11.00
7.70
11.10
7.70
10.40
11.80
8.00
9.40

2005
9.50
9.20
10.20
10.90
11.50
12.80
8.90
10.30
7.30
10.60
11.40
7.30
9.80

2006
8.30
9.20
11.80
9.30
13.80
11.70
9.10
10.70
11.80
11.60
10.50
8.80
9.40

2007
8.60
9.10
9.90
10.30
11.50
9.50
9.60
9.30
10.60
10.10
10.50
8.00
12.40

2008
8.10
9.90
9.00
11.40
11.00
10.60
9.50
9.00
7.50
10.40
12.50
8.40
7.80

2009
8.90
7.20
8.10
9.10
10.30
10.30
7.00
9.60
10.10
11.10
11.50
7.20
10.80

2010 Average
7.60
8.53
8.70
10.03
7.20
10.01
8.90
10.06
10.60
11.85
9.30
11.06
8.00
8.49
8.90
9.91
8.90
9.26
10.90
9.89
12.50
11.31
8.70
8.40
9.20
9.43

2012

Table 6. Median Time Intervals From Filing to Disposition
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
All U.S. D.C.
8.00 8.00 9.00 8.20 8.70 8.70 9.30
Alaska
9.50 10.10 7.90 9.90 11.70 13.60 14.90
Arizona
9.40 10.60 11.30 10.70 10.80 10.70 10.00
Hawaii
6.70 8.70 12.10 11.30 11.00 9.60 12.00
Idaho
13.40 13.20 13.80 11.30 10.60 11.50 11.80
Montana
11.80 11.10 12.10 10.00 11.60 11.10 11.90
Nevada
7.00 7.50 9.20 8.10 10.60 8.60 8.10
New Mexico
9.00 10.00 10.20 10.70 10.00 10.00 10.00
North Dakota 9.20 9.90 9.40 9.00 8.70 9.70 9.80
Oregon
8.60 8.00 9.10 8.70 9.90 9.40 9.60
South Dakota 10.80 11.10 12.00 11.20 12.30 10.90 9.40
Vermont
10.60 9.30 9.40 7.90 7.50 9.00 7.50
Wyoming
7.80 9.50 9.00 10.20 9.00 8.40 9.30
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2005
14.90
5.80
5.10
8.70
8.10
5.00
4.50
4.00
2.60
3.10
7.80
3.10
22.30

2006
11.00
9.40
6.70
8.20
7.10
10.60
4.60
4.30
3.20
3.40
7.20
8.30
25.50

2007
6.60
7.30
6.10
4.50
6.60
9.10
5.20
3.50
2.00
3.60
3.30
6.10
4.10

2008
7.30
10.70
6.40
3.50
6.90
10.30
5.70
11.20
6.50
5.00
4.10
7.90
3.60

2009
11.70
6.90
3.90
4.20
6.50
10.60
4.60
3.60
4.80
4.50
4.80
6.80
3.60

2010 Average
15.80
11.06
9.30
8.63
3.00
5.80
3.20
8.53
5.40
5.61
8.70
7.72
7.50
4.15
15.70
5.78
6.40
2.98
4.60
3.23
8.60
4.69
7.80
4.65
2.10
12.95

50

Table 7. Percentage of Cases Pending Three Years or More
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
All U.S.D.C.
8.30 9.60 6.80 12.20 14.00 N/A 13.00 12.60
Alaska
7.50 19.20 0.30 8.60 13.70 N/A 7.40 6.10
Arizona
5.60 7.20 6.20 7.00 7.00 N/A 5.70 5.50
Hawaii
3.60 3.40 2.00 24.60 25.40 N/A 11.50 8.10
Idaho
4.10 3.30 3.70 3.10 3.90 N/A 6.50 7.70
Montana
10.00 11.20 7.00 6.90 6.40 N/A 4.00 0.50
Nevada
1.70 2.10 1.40 3.50 3.30 N/A 4.40 5.40
New Mexico
6.40 9.40 3.60 2.40 3.80 N/A 3.30 3.90
North Dakota 1.80 1.70 1.20 1.60 2.80 N/A 2.40 1.80
Oregon
2.00 2.60 2.10 2.90 3.00 N/A 2.40 2.80
South Dakota 2.40 2.20 1.90 3.60 3.80 N/A 5.70 5.60
Vermont
5.90 3.60 2.20 2.00 2.60 N/A 1.70 2.40
Wyoming
11.80 21.60 22.50 4.70 4.20 N/A 20.20 22.20
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